DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 194 443 SO 012 997

AUTHOR Hesburgh, Theodore M.: Halle, Louis J.
TITLE Foreign Policy & Morality: Framework for a Moral Audit.
INSTITUTION Council on Religion and International Affairs, New York, N.Y.
PUB DATE 79
NOTE 60p.
AVAILABLE FROM Council on Religion and International Affairs, 170 East 64th Street, New York, NY 10021 ($4.00).

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Civil Liberties: Civil Rights: Essays: *Foreign Policy: *Moral Issues: *Moral Values

ABSTRACT

Two papers and several commentaries discuss a viable moral framework for foreign policy. It is hoped that the thought of some of the world's major thinkers can provide at least the foundations for a more enduring approach to the issues of political morality. The two main papers are by Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., president of the University of Notre Dame and one of America's most untiring defenders of civil and human rights and by Professor Louis Halle of Geneva, author of numerous books on foreign policy and the study in universal history, "Out of Chaos." The two writers approach the moral problem from different points on the intellectual spectrum. Father Hesburgh approaches the problem from the standpoint of America's responsibility to express and exemplify its historic national goals and moral vision in foreign policy. Professor Halle's approach is from the perspective of the national interest. He maintains with some of the "Founding Fathers" that the first duty of the United States is not in moral preachments but in the moral example it provides to the rest of the world by its conduct at home. Following the two papers are commentaries by leading representative thinkers from the United States and the world. The commentaries illuminate the similarities and differences between the two viewpoints and subject them to critical review. (Author/RM)

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Foreign Policy & Morality

Framework for a Moral Audit

Theodore M. Hesburgh
Louis J. Halle

Commentary: John C. Bennett, George F. Kennan, John P. Armstrong, Philip C. Jessup, E. Raymond Platig

Preface and Concluding Remarks: Kenneth W. Thompson

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Library of Congress No. 78-74116

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Preface

To acknowledge that men and nations espouse values and goals that transcend national survival or defense is to take the first step toward a moral framework, but it does not solve the moral problem. This acknowledgment is in fact more a claim or declaration than an approach. Morality, in contrast to cynicism, moralism, or innocence, is the endless quest for what is right amidst the complexity of competing — and sometimes conflicting, sometimes compatible — moral ends. Professor Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School based his 1976 Thomas Jefferson Memorial Lecture of the National Endowment for the Humanities on Lord Acton's axiom, "when you perceive a truth, look for a balancing truth." According to Professor Freund, we suffer in Western civilization from the decline of the ancient tradition of moral reasoning, the essence of which is balancing not only good and evil but competing "goods."

Freedom and order, liberty and justice, economic growth and equality, national interest and the well-being of mankind are each in themselves worthy moral ends. Each has its claim on the leader who seeks the good society or a peaceful world. How simple moral choice would be if the leader could select one moral value as his guiding principle and ignore all the rest! In every human community, however, the choice between right and wrong is endlessly fraught with complexity and grounded in deep moral pathos. In contrast with the simple rationalist view of an easy harmony of values and interests, there is, in life, an inescapably tragic character to moral choice. Within the family, men are all too often drawn to choose between family interests and professional responsibilities, between faithfulness to one and neglect of the other. Loyalty to spouse and children may conflict with response to the needs of aging and distant parents. Within the national community, freedom of speech and assembly may clash with the

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requirements of security and order. The Supreme Court has decided that freedom of speech does not involve the right to cry fire in a crowded theatre. The right to a fair trial may collide with the right to know and the freedom of the press. Free scientific inquiry seems not to justify the right of a graduate student to produce a nuclear bomb in his kitchen. Even within the most developed democracy every political and constitutional principle coexists and is related to every other principle, and each is at most a partial expression of morality. As Reinhold Niebuhr wrote: "Democracy cannot exist if there is no recognition of the fragmentary character of all systems of values which are allowed to exist within its frame."

Within the family and the democratic nation, forces are at work to protect fragmentary values and interests, to hold moral absolutism in check, and to prevent men from erecting a single principle into an all-controlling moral dogma. The rights of the individual are weighed against the rights of the group. A vast array of constitutional and political principles and evolving institutions and social legislation is invoked to prevent abuses that threaten the weakest elements of society, including minorities and the powerless, little children, the infirm and the aged. The law of love, which lies beyond the reach of most large collectivities (neither political parties, corporations, nor organized churches love one another), is, theoretically at least, a practical possibility within the family. However, even within the family some form of distributive justice may prove man's highest moral attainment, as even a loving husband and wife or parents and children can attest. Justice within the family involves giving each party his or her due, and often what is right is as much a matter of calculating needs and interests as of unselfish love.

Within the nation and state the Bill of Rights and the American constitutional system provide means of mediating justice for individuals and groups, minorities and majorities, the weak and the strong. As love is mediated through justice in the family, the "Higher Law" principles on which the Constitution is based support the unending quest for rights within American society. The health of democracy rests finally on the possibility of minorities becoming majorities, on some approximation of justice, and on a common sense recognition that no single value or principle is a final guide to moral rectitude. In Niebuhr's words: "The triumph of common sense . . . is primarily the wisdom of democracy itself which prevents [anyone's] strategy from being carried though to its logical conclusion. There is an element of truth which becomes falsehood precisely when it is carried through too consistently."

The moral problem for politics among nations, however it may resemble that of the family and nation, is more com-

plex and manysided. It must be sought within a quite fragile, troubled, and divided community of politically unequal states. Today more than 140 nations make up international society, each with its own political and economic system, institutions and practices, needs and traditions. Each has its own requirements of governance, its necessities of state, and its own rights and restraints. The first duty of the national statesman is preservation of the union — a requirement that both limits his actions and directs some of them along lines that are offensive to ideas of personal morality. President Lincoln pointed to this requirement in his letter to Horace Greeley, saying: "My primary purpose is to save the Union." He would save the Union if it meant freeing all the slaves, or if it meant freeing none of the slaves, or if it meant freeing some but not others. His choice, from the standpoint of national morality, was not necessarily the choice he would have made from the standpoint of personal morality. For other national statesmen the demands have appeared even more severe, prompting the Italian nationalist Cavour to declare: "If we had done for ourselves what we did for the state, what scoundrels we would be."

The crux of the matter, then, is that foreign policy is conducted by governments and must serve the purposes of government as informed by the national interest. At the same time, governments, and especially the United States, are not immune from certain overall constraints. On the one hand the United States sees itself as subject to certain moral limitations and ultimate judgments; on the other hand it looks to inherent national goals and historic traditions as the basis and moral justification for its actions. Seldom if ever is foreign policy defended by arguing solely for the maintenance or increase of national power or national survival. Americans and the leaders of most nations speak rather of standing for moral purposes beyond the state: democracy or communism, freedom or equality, order or justice, moral necessity and historical inevitability. Whatever cynics may say, foreign policy tends to be articulated in moral terms, even in most authoritarian regimes, whether as social justice, economic equality, the overthrow of colonialism, national liberation, or putting an end to an unjust status quo. Even in the most cynical appeal to such ends, their appeal may be partly virtuous, for in politics "hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue."

We have asked two authorities of preeminent standing to help us explore the broad outlines of a viable moral framework for foreign policy, Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., president of the University of Notre Dame, one of America's most untiring defenders of civil and human rights, and Professor Louis Halle of Geneva, author of numerous books on foreign policy and the monumental

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study in universal history, *Out of Chaos*. The two writers approach the moral problem from different points on the intellectual spectrum. Father Hesburgh, who may prove to have been the major force behind the human rights emphasis of the Carter administration, from the standpoint of America's responsibility to express and exemplify its historic national goals and moral vision in foreign policy and Professor Halle from the perspective of the national interest, maintaining with some of the "Founding Fathers" that the first duty of the United States is not in moral preachments but in the moral example it provides to the rest of the world by its conduct at home.

To illuminate the similarities and differences between these two viewpoints and to subject them to critical review we have also called on leading representative thinkers from the United States and the world. Two are former diplomats and public servants who have also been among the most influential writers on foreign policy in any country, George F. Kennan, formerly head of the Policy Planning staff of the State Department and professor of history at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies, and Judge Philip C. Jessup, formerly the American judge on the International Court of Justice and American ambassador to the United Nations as well as a distinguished professor of international law at Columbia University. Another is Dr. E. Raymond Platig, director of the Bureau of External Research in the Department of State and author of some of the most challenging papers on morality and foreign policy, and in particular the views of such twentieth-century secretaries of state as John Foster Dulles. We have also asked an authority on Asian foreign policy, Professor John P. Armstrong of Bowdoin College, who is an interpreter and critic of American foreign policy in the 1940's and 1950's, to comment on the papers. Dr. John C. Bennett, former president of Union Theological Seminary in New York City and co-founder with Reinhold Niebuhr of the influential Protestant journal *Christianity and Crisis*, is the fifth critic of the Hesburgh-Halle papers.

It would be presumptuous to expect that a single set of essays, however thoughtful, could provide anything approaching a definitive statement on morality and foreign policy. It has not been the assumption of the editor or the writers or of the sponsoring organization, the Council on Religion and International affairs, that these essays could offer a universally acceptable moral framework. At the same time, the thought of some of the world's major thinkers can provide at least the foundations for a more enduring approach to the great issues of political morality. They will also enable successive writers from the United States and from all over the world to contribute what we at CRIA see as an ongoing moral audit of American foreign policy.

one of the three pillars of CRIA's approach to "Ethics and Foreign Policy." Each year we expect to invite other writers and observers to help us look at one or more aspects of American foreign policy and to determine what progress the nation's leaders have made in the shaping of a moral foreign policy. One year we may review human rights, another year foreign assistance, and another year national security policies, asking what advances and retreats the Republic has made. The nation has profited from annual audits of public and foreign policy in other sectors, for example, the Brookings Institution's annual economic audit. It should not be beyond the reach of some of the best minds in Western civilization and the developing countries to offer similar judgments on the complex and exacting sphere of morality and foreign policy. In any event, this is the task we have set ourselves, with the full backing of CRIA's president and board of trustees and the generosity of the Compton Foundation and its tireless leader, Randolph Compton. To attempt less would be to abandon the mandate of CRIA's founder, Andrew Carnegie; to claim more would be out of keeping with the spirit and philosophy of CRIA. It will remain for good and decent people here and abroad profoundly concerned with the issues of morality and foreign policy to judge the effort and reflect on the conclusions and suggestions contained in these essays.

Kenneth W. Thompson

Moral Aspirations & American Foreign Policy

Theodore M. Hesburgh

American aspiration, like love, is a many-splendored thing. Its roots are deep in the history of this country. In great part it is the sum of the aspirations of every single American who came to these shores, if they came freely as most did, seeking something splendid, something impossible to obtain in the land they left. In great part, also, the aspirations of Americans are what can be derived from the thoughts, often conflicting, of our Founding Fathers and how these thoughts found expression in our basic documents, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. To these two considerations one must add immediately the fact that aspirations, like everything human, tend to evolve, develop, and even change over time. History is a safe departure point, but the further we progress from that primordial starting point, the greater the danger of history being rewritten to fit some modern persuasion or concern or even hope.

I would like to begin on the firmest ground we have available, a shorthand look at the history of those days when America, as we know and love it, really began. In this *tour d'horizon* I shall merely try to state the facts as they are generally known and accepted. Interpretation comes after the fact.

It is an interesting fact that our Western Hemisphere was one of the last to be known and settled by what was then considered "civilized man," which in our prejudiced way comes to read "Western man." The fact is that men and women, human beings, had been in our hemisphere somewhere between fifteen and forty millennia before Western man arrived. While we would consider their lifestyle generally primitive, it was, for the longest part of their history, no more primitive than that of most other humans around the world. Somehow they did manage to feed and clothe and organize themselves politically. They also

created, in complete isolation, two rather extraordinary civilizations, the Maya in Meso-America and the Inca in the high plateaus of South America.

Our story of America, of its aspirations as reflected in the Declaration and the Constitution, really begins with the arrival of two new groups, the English in Virginia and the Pilgrims in New England. (I am indebted to Alistair Cooke's *America* for many of the facts and insights that follow.) While both settlements were potential disasters, they both became, with all that followed, one of the most significant human and political experiments in the history of mankind.

Before tracing the history of this political development, one should think for a moment about the land that was about to be resettled. Its three million square miles have everything our good planet can provide, more useful forest and mineral wealth than any other land — one-half the coal on earth, for example. It is laced with rivers and dotted with lakes, large and small. No country on earth can match its Midwestern agricultural lands and climate. Its mountains are both modest and spectacular. It is bounded by the two greatest oceans and felicitously situated between 22° and 55° North. Below it are debilitating tropics, and above it much land that is comparatively bleak and unproductive.

Since one cannot reproduce this total magnificent land mass anywhere in the world, perhaps it should not be mentioned in interpreting the meaning of the American experience for the rest of the world. However, it would seem uncritical to recount that experience without at least mentioning the physiognomy of the great land in which it occurred. Land is given. It may be well or badly used. It is only the spirit and character of a people that eventually shape a land, forge a nation upon it.

Somehow, in our story, the spirit of the people was to match the great goodness and expansiveness of this land. Even so, for our forebears there was, in fact, a great land waiting for nationhood. Once the Virginians and the Pilgrims were in place, granting that they brought with them a great heritage, both positive and negative, events moved quickly, as history goes. Remember that the Mayas, our early neighbors, were a thousand years or two developing as a people, and their striking civilization flourished from 100 B.C. until a century before the year 1000, when they disintegrated internally and were conquered by the Toltecs. Six hundred years later, when Christopher Columbus and his followers touched these shores, the stage was set for a new experiment. A vast continent was available. Successive waves of people would arrive and a new form of self-government would emerge. It would, like all history, result from what people did and how they were led, how

their new aspirations took shape in their new and emerging institutions.

In Virginia the creative leaders were Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry, and the institutions, formal and informal, were the House of Burgesses and the Raleigh Tavern. In Massachusetts, John Winthrop was the man and the Mayflower Compact the instrument that gave rise to a basic form of self-government, which grew quickly under Governor Winthrop's leadership. One might note for future reference that Winthrop wanted to create a city of God, originally in Ireland, then in Virginia, which he fortuitously missed by bad navigation, giving him the chance to form independently the Missachusetts Bay Colony. It should also be noted that, before they had a say in government through election, these people had to be certified as God's elect. Also, the new liberties were only for Puritans at first, not others.

Within a year of his arrival Winthrop's government had guaranteed trial by jury, protection of life and property by due process, freedom from self-incrimination, and no taxes for nonvoters. Fortunately, the lowly cod made the colony economically viable, as tobacco did in Virginia.

As we begin to speak of the American experience it should be remembered that we are referring to thirteen colonies spread thinly along 1,400 miles of Atlantic coastline. These thirteen colonies were like thirteen nations, each with its own government, currency, trade, law, and special religious customs. What was special about them, even as colonies, were their own meetings, their having elected rather than appointed state militias, their abolition of primogeniture, and, in general, their freedom. Curiously, for those early years, what really bound the thirteen together was their allegiance to the King of England, until George III upset the applecart.

When George III tried, via the Stamp Act, to make the colonists pay for the expenses of the Franco-British war in America, the reaction on this side of the Atlantic was violent. When, through unusual political stupidity, all the taxes were revoked except that on tea, which almost everybody drank, there was a series of events that all remember: the Boston Massacre, the Tea Party, the meeting in Old South Church. This revolution was conceived in the name of freedom and liberty — heady notions for colonists.

The colonial underground with its Committees of Correspondence was formed, and Sam Adams, leader of the Boston Tea Party, called for a Continental Congress, with Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry aiding and abetting from Raleigh Tavern in Virginia.

Again, the distant British government overreacted. The port of Boston — a vital colonial economic lifeline — was closed, and General Thomas Gage was dispatched there

with four regiments of troops. In Williamsburg, Virginia, the House of Burgesses was closed. (They would have done better to close Raleigh Tavern and South Church.)

The denouement came quickly with the Philadelphia meeting of the rebels and — following Lexington, Concord, and the "shot heard around the world" in April of 1775 — the selection of forty-three-year-old George Washington as Continental Commander.

It is amazing how great documents are sometimes composed in humble circumstances. At the beginning of the hot summer of 1776 five remarkable early Americans gathered in a room over a horse stable in Philadelphia. (One thinks of the smell and the horseflies.) These five men represented in microcosm the three cultures of the thirteen colonies: John Adams, the Puritan oligarchy of New England; Roger Sherman of Connecticut, Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, and Robert Livingston of New York, the mercantile middle colonies; and Thomas Jefferson, who at the age of thirty-three wrote the stirring final draft, the great Southern aristocracy.

I suppose it can fairly be said that more than anything else the Declaration of Independence continues to state the deepest aspirations of the American people. The Declaration was dated on the fourth of July, but published a day earlier. Later, fifty-six greats would sign and endorse it, thus pledging their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor for the revolutionary ideas the Declaration now proclaimed to all the world. The signers were not really revolutionary types, although they had the spirit of a new creation, of — as Crevecoeur put it — "this new man." John Hancock signed at the top with a bold flourish so that, he said, "The King of England could read it without his glasses."

If the world was to be shaken, then and in the years to come, it would be because of two basic revolutionary statements:

> That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
>
> That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Nothing could be more alien political doctrine in the lands and traditions of monarchy from which the ancestors of these men came a short century and a half before. In the years ahead, and in the centuries that followed, these same revolutionary ideas would help to end monarchical France, the German Empire, Imperial Russia, and, in our lifetime, colonies all around the world.

Five years later, on October 19, 1781, Lord Cornwallis surrendered to the so-called rabble army at Yorktown. In

1783 the peace treaty was signed in Paris.

Newly independent, but not yet *united*, states. The committee to draft the Articles of Confederation had begun work nine days after publication of the Declaration of Independence. By 1781 these Articles were the law of Congress, but they simply produced what was called the "Disunited States of America," all the states going their own merry way, with Congress the only national institution. The fatal flaw was the attempt to establish a national government while leaving to the states ultimate sovereignty. This reminds us somewhat of the plight of the United Nations today.

The Declaration had declared rights and liberty, but it did not specify the form of government under which these were to be secured. There was an exalted end, a high purpose in clear view, but no effective instrument of government to achieve the dream of the Declaration.

Happily, fifty-five of the Founding Fathers were again called together in 1787 in Philadelphia, at the State House now called Independence Hall. The Fathers were the most civilized of the revolutionaries, the élite of government, business, and the professions in the various states. Half of them were lawyers; more than half were college graduates. Their average age was forty-two. Again, unlikely revolutionaries.

The task before them was stark and simple: to establish a government that, unlike the Articles of Confederation, would effectively balance the power between the central government and the states. How to accomplish this was not as simple, although they managed to complete their work in seventeen weeks.

In general they knew what they were against: monarchy and standing armies, which were almost always used to suppress freedom. They wanted a republic, but what kind? George Washington, as chairman, used his considerable prestige to hold the convention together — in secrecy no less — and focused on the central issue, which was argued from two extremes. Alexander Hamilton, the protagonist of the aristocratic principle, wanted a very strong central government that could veto the states, which he would have preferred to eliminate altogether. Hamilton also wanted a President and Senate elected for life. George Mason of Virginia, twice Hamilton's age, argued the other extreme. Mason wanted the weakest central government possible, consonant with confederacy. Having previously drawn up the Virginia Bill of Rights, he wanted a similar bill for America, to include his favorite rights: freedom from unreasonable search and double jeopardy, and freedom of assembly. Neither Hamilton nor Mason won the day. Mason even lost his Bill of Rights for a time.

The mediator who saved the day and made the Consti-

tution possible was James Madison, thirty-six, also of Virginia. For Madison, true to the Declaration, the main purpose of government was "to act upon and for the individual citizen," protecting minorities from the majority, granting no states' rights above the central government. Madison's key dictum was that if men were virtuous, there would be no need for governments at all. Taking a dimmer view than Jefferson about human virtue, he suggested a government of checks and balances, with separate branches of government responsible to different constituencies. In this he was faithfully following Montesquieu. He was willing to let these separate powers collide for their own good political health, with a President to keep an eye on Congress, a Congress to keep an eye on the President, and a Supreme Court to keep an eye on both of them. The Supreme Court is the key here, since its concern is not for precedents of common law but, purely and simply, for the Constitution that controls the legitimacy of both presidential and congressional action. He would have the national government represent all variety of men, interests, and factions.

The convention decided that, to achieve balance, all states would have two senators and a proportionate number of representatives in the House for lesser terms to represent the grass roots, as it were. The national government, the source of national unity, would neither coerce nor rival the states. All powers not stipulated for the purposes of national government would devolve on the states, which would control such matters as education, highways, taxation, banking, liquor laws, criminal and civil codes. Without this last concession, the states would have left the convention.

So the Constitution evolved in the weeks that followed and was ultimately adopted by the states, though not without difficulty. The vote in Virginia, for example, was eighty-nine for and seventy-nine against, Patrick Henry and George Mason voting against.

The historic drama was not quite finished. Thomas Jefferson, who as minister to France was not in the convention, heard of Mason's failure to get the Bill of Rights. Jefferson felt that the Constitution, as written, was a good political document, but imperfect without a specific guarantee of the rights for which all of them had fought and had separated themselves from the crown. He urged twenty such basic rights — the true specific aspirations of all Americans — and within four years ten amendments were passed comprising most of his twenty and allowing for others to come. In fact, sixteen more have been added since, and we are presently considering others. It may well be that Jefferson, too, saved the day because the Constitution, without the Bill of Rights, may just not have been workable, especially

as the Constitution became more detached in men's minds from the Declaration, that clarion call for liberty. The Constitution, along with the Bill of Rights, was the engine created to make the aspirations and promise of the Declaration of Independence come true. That promise has been two hundred years in the making.

I suppose it is quite natural that as America grew and prospered it was asked what the Founding Fathers really meant and how well they spoke for the aspirations of Americans, not only then, but in the present day. Some question whether they really spoke to the world at all. These are perhaps unfair questions, but they are being asked and should be answered.

One of the best responses to these questions appears in an issue of *Public Interest* (Fall, 1975) specially prepared for the Bicentennial. The focus of this collection of articles, written by scholars of congenial concern, is a reaction to modern America in the light of Lord Bryce's classic, *The American Commonwealth*, published in 1888, not long after America's Centennial. Lord Bryce wrote:

> The institutions of the United States are deemed by inhabitants and admitted by strangers to be a matter of more general interest than those of not less famous nations of the Old World. They are, or are supposed to be, institutions of a new type. They form, or are supposed to form, a symmetrical whole, capable of being studied and judged together more profitably than the less perfectly harmonized institutions of older countries. They represent an experiment in the rule of the multitude, tried on a scale unprecedentedly vast, and the results of which everyone is concerned to watch. And yet they are something more than an experiment, for they are believed to disclose and display the type of institutions towards which, as by a law of fate, the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move, some with swifter, others with slower, but all with unresting feet.

In the vernacular of today's youth, the response of the scholars who wrote for *Public Interest* was "no way." Daniel Patrick Moynihan led the procession in his introduction when he said that the American experiment in democracy is not going very well.

> Neither liberty nor democracy would seem to be prospering — or in any event neither would seem to have a future — nearly as auspicious as their past.

As to others following our lead, he adds:

> To the contrary, liberal democracy on the American model increasingly tends to the condition of monarchy in the 19th century; a hold-over form of government which persists in isolated or particular places here and there, and which may even serve well enough for special circumstances, but

which has no relevance for the future. It is where the world was, not where it is going.

It is true, as Moynihan observes, that we held the field during much of the nineteenth century and reached a kind of apogee with Woodrow Wilson in 1919, then to be challenged by all forms of socialist regimes, some or even most now masquerading under the name of democratic republics. Of our own patriotic stance, Moynihan says: "The flag remains, but little else that is not battered or banal or both." He has for us only one last word of hope, more reminiscent of Greek political philosophy than of Locke or Montesquieu: "For when all else is gone, virtue remains. If it has ever existed, it is present still."

On this slim reed of hope I would base my disagreement with him and most of the authors of this volume, insofar as they too often exude an all-permeating pessimism on the future of America or of America's aspirations. Most of what they say is true, but there are various ways of interpreting the truth, especially as one looks to the future. Lord Bryce could not have been quite as expansive had he written but a dozen years earlier, at the very time of the Centennial. History brings problems, but also new hope and new perspectives. All is not lost, despite the current pessimism of many intellectuals.

As a sagacious Frenchman once wrote: "At each epoch of history the world was in a hopeless state, and at each epoch of history, the world muddled through; at each epoch, the world was lost, and at each epoch, it was saved" (Jacques Maritain in *Reflections on America*). One hopes that this is still true today.

However, before hoping for the best, one should look to the worst. Here, very briefly, is what the authors in the special issue of *Public Interest* reflect:

The opening essay by Samuel Huntington states that the democratic circuits are presently overloaded by the demands of minority and other special-interest groups. He believes, if I read him correctly, that they demand more than democracy can deliver and they demand it here and now and all at once. Unless they learn to moderate their demands, democracy overindulged will become a threat to America. He quotes John Adams: "Democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy that did not commit suicide." And Huntington adds: "A value which is good in itself is not necessarily optimized when it is maximized . . . there are potentially desirable limits to the extension of political democracy. Democracy could have a longer life if it has a more balanced existence."

Another author, Martin Diamond, is seized by the idea that modern academics have reversed the Founding

Fathers' idea of liberty as the goal and demoracy as the means to attain it. Democracy has been transformed into the uniform litmus paper of our worldwide approval or disapproval of governments, an ideology "of equality in every respect." As he puts it:

> The underlying complaint against American political order is no longer a matter of mere reforms, or even of wholesale constitutional revision, although there is always a kind of itch in that direction, but rather a critique of the entire regime in the name of a demand for equality in every aspect of human life. It is a demand which consists in a kind of absolutization of a single principle, the principle of equality, and at the same time of an absolutization of the democratic form of government understood as the vehicle for that complete equality. This is a different posture towards democracy indeed than that embodied in the American founding.

Diamond is raising the question whether liberty or egalitarianism is the prime goal of America, and whether democracy, which is not even mentioned in the Constitution, is to be taken as a means or an end.

A whole spate of authors who follow say that America is ready for a decentralization of political power, and a lowering of utopian morality, especially worldwide, a realization that the American government cannot do everything.

The final essay of the series, written by Daniel Bell, reiterates a common theme: that America has had a loss of innocence and is now coming of age with a sense of its mortality and fallibility. Bell concludes:

> The recent political history of the successive administrations has left the nation with much moral disrepute. All of this places a great responsibility on the leadership of the society. This necessitates the recreation of a moral credibility whose essential condition is simple honesty and openness. It means the conscious commitment in foreign policy to limit the national power to purposes proportionate with national interest, and to forego any hegemonic dream, even of being the moral policeman of the world. Domestically it means the renewed commitment to the policy of inclusion whereby disadvantaged groups have priority in social policy, both as an act of justice, and to diffuse social tensions that could explode. The act of "conscious will" has to replace the wavering supports of American exceptionalism as the means of holding the society together.
>
> Of all the gifts bestowed on this country at its founding, the one that alone remains as the element of American exceptionalism is the constitutionalism system, with a comity that has been undergirded by history. And it is the recognition of history, now that the future has receded, which provided the meaning of becoming twice-born. America was the exemplary once-born nation, the land of sky-blue optimism in which the traditional ills of civiliza-

tion were, as Emerson once said, merely the measles and whooping cough of growing up. The act of becoming twice-born, the entrance into maturity, is the recognition of mortality of countries within the time scales of history.

I should apologize for interpreting so much from so little, but I did read the articles in question carefully, and do conclude that the last thing the American people, and indeed the world, need is more pessimism. Granted we are at a difficult juncture in the history of mankind and are at times reminded of Ronald Knox's jingle:

> God's world had a hopeful beginning
> But man marred his chances by sinning
> We hope that the story
> Will end in God's glory
> But at present the other side's winning

If man needs one commodity today, more than anything else it is hope. Despite all America's flaws — and today we are in a paroxysm to exhibit all in detail — the simple fact is that America and its aspirations are still the best expression of what I would call mankind's universal hope.

John Nef ended his book *The United States and Civilization* with a similar thought, paraphrasing together both Rousseau and Marx:

> Goodness and wisdom were born free, but everywhere they are in chains. Good people, honorable people, intelligent people, truth-loving people of the world, unite. You have nothing material to gain for yourselves; but you have the opportunity to serve humanity. You have the opportunity to bring about a rebirth of the human mind and spirit.

Such a rebirth will not occur, even in our times, if the American experience fails, which is to say, if we lose heart. We, as a people, said Lincoln, were conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Few, if any, bodies politic began quite this way or lasted quite this long under an inspired constitution. Few, if any, countries have received so many miserable people, over so brief a span of time, and inspired them so quickly with a common ideal and a common task of achieving liberty and justice for all. No country has such a variegated population representing every nationality, color, culture, and religion on earth.

America has more blacks than there are Canadians in Canada, more Spanish-speaking people than Australians in Australia, more American Indians than when Columbus arrived, two or three times more Jews than Israel.

During the potato famine of the 1840's and 1850's, when a million in Ireland died, more than a fourth of the population of Ireland came to America. Before 1890 the largest influx of immigrants was from Germany, Scandinavia, En-

gland, and Ireland, and afterwards from Italy, Austria, Hungary, Russia, Poland, and just about everywhere else. In the first two decades of this century over 14.5 million people passed through Ellis Island, at times eight thousand a day, with fifteen thousand waiting in New York Harbor, most of them illiterate, most possessing only the required $25, but all filled with limitless new hope.

Somehow all learned to live together, with increasing comity and tolerance and, one should add, the kind of virtue that only such an unusual situation could elicit. In a sense our American population, like no other on earth, represents the spread, the variety, as well as the yearnings of universal humanity. If we cannot press forward to achieve these basic aspirations of liberty, equality, and fraternity — to borrow from the French — in a government that Lincoln described best as "of the people, by the people, for the people," I do not know what other nation is likely to do so on such a scale and with such a dramatis personae as America possesses.

Again, Lincoln put it best in his first inaugural message, speaking of the basic American aspiration: "The struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men; to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all; to afford all an unfettered start and a fair chance in the race of life."

Lincoln was under no illusion that America's experiment was complete, a closed book. In fact, he was facing the greatest contradiction and flaw in our history; slavery. It is a curious fact that even the Founding Fathers could not honestly solve this dilemma. There was to have been a brave denunciation of slavery in the Declaration of Independence, but it was deleted at the insistence of Southern slave owners and Northern shippers. In the Articles of Confederation the quota of troops was specified in proportion to the white population at the insistence of the South. During the discussion on the Constitution, a Southerner, George Mason, proposed to abolish slavery but was defeated. Almost a century passed before the nation went to war on the issue.

When Lincoln proposed the Emancipation Proclamation, his whole cabinet voted nay. Lincoln voted aye and remarked, "The ayes have it." The Proclamation emerged during the Civil War in 1863. But even then, even after the end of the war and the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments, the matter was not settled. President Hayes sold out the blacks to gain the South and the presidency. The nation took a monumental step backwards as Reconstruction came to an inglorious end. Even the Supreme Court capped it with *Plessy* vs. Ferguson.

Over a half century passed before the Supreme Court

began, with the *Brown* decision in 1954, to undo the damages. President Eisenhower then remarked that his appointment of Earl Warren as chief justice was one of his great mistakes. In fact, little happened. In the next decade, less than 3 per cent of the *de jure* dual school systems of the South were integrated. It took another Southerner, Lyndon Johnson, to complete what Missourian Harry Truman had begun by his integration of the armed forces after World War II. Johnson really pushed the Congress after John Kennedy's assassination to pass the landmark Civil Rights acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968.

In the one short decade of the Sixties this nation at long last corrected the injustices and indignities of more than three centuries, granting American blacks equality of opportunity in voting, education, employment, housing, administration of justice, political participation, and public accommodations. The latter, following the passage of the 1964 Omnibus Civil Rights Act, overturned in one day vicious laws and customs dating back to the arrival of the first black slave in then white America.

I submit that no nation — ever — has accomplished more in a decade for human rights and the ultimate vindication of justice than America did in the decade of the '60's. This action was more important by far as a positive step forward than the negative actions of Vietnam and Watergate. It is also a reason for hope of what might yet be accomplished.

I believe that at least this illustrates in the modern context the truism that the battle for freedom and equality, for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is never truly won. Each generation of Americans, indeed of all humanity, must strive to achieve these aspirations anew. Liberty is a living flame to be fed, not dead ashes to be revered. The world at large is ever conscious of what is happening in America, good and evil. They are even more conscious of what we are doing to make our aspirations work, here or wherever in the world we do business or diplomacy.

It is no mistake or accident of history that after World War II an American and a Frenchman, a woman and a man, a Christian and a Jew — Eleanor Roosevelt and René Cassin — wrote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is a shame that a few important nations, ourselves included, have never officially approved the two great United Nations Protocols that flowed from this Declaration — that of political and civil rights, and that of economic, social, and cultural rights. It would be a great and symbolic act to do so now. I believe deeply that these statements of human rights represent the truest aspirations of Americans and of humankind generally. We must lead the way today, as we did at the time of our nation's birth. We might also push, at this time, for the appointment of a United Nationals High Commissioner of Human Rights, to be the conscience of

the world in this most important and, today, highly violated area.

As Madame de Staël told a Boston scholar in 1817: "You are the advance guard of the human race." Ten years later Goethe remarked: "*Amerika, du hast es besser als unser Kontinent.*" A century later, in the early hours of the morning of November 11, 1918, the day of the Armistice, Woodrow Wilson wrote: "Everything for which America has fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by example, by sober friendly counsel and by material aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world." Sailing for France and the Peace Conference, he said: "We are to be an instrument in the hands of God to see that liberty is made secure for mankind." An impossible dream for those days perhaps, when America turned inward and rejected the League of Nations, but again we did better in avoiding isolationism and creating new international organizations after the next world war. Anyway, the aspirations for liberty, justice, and peace lived on, despite the dismal decade of the Twenties.

In a turnabout of history Franklin Roosevelt said that he was sending arms to a beleaguered Britain "to enable them to fight for their liberty and our security. We have the men, the skill, the wealth, and, above all, the will. We must be the great arsenal of democracy."

Finally, two decades and a half after World War II, during a cold war, John Kennedy continued the presidential tradition of expressing our national aspiration for all the world to hear with the words of his inaugural: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

Is all of this empty rhetoric, or is it a constant tradition, from the Declaration of two hundred years ago, that still speaks of liberty to the heart of our people and to the world? I, for one, do not believe that America is a thwarted experiment, a burned-out case, a fading hope. Despite the negativism of the day, we are becoming "twice born," coming of age, and it is not the decrepitude of old age. A wise man once said that liberty is the luxury of self-discipline. We do indeed need much more self-discipline in America today. The world may or may not follow, but we must lead because our tradition says we must; liberty is worth the effort, and the creation of justice and peace abroad will in large measure depend on the measure of justice and peace that we create here at home. Whatever its faults, America is still the most exciting human experiment in all the world.

Sometimes in the heat and even despair of the constant struggle to live up to our aspirations in increasingly

complex and muddled world it might raise our spirits and deepen our faith and hope to see ourselves as others see us. The French philosopher Jacques Maritain, writing in America in 1943, when his home country was under the Nazi heel and anything but free, explained:

> There is indeed one thing that Europe knows and knows only too well; that is the tragic significance of life. . . . There is one thing that America knows well and that she teaches as a great and precious lesson to those who come in contact with her astounding adventure: it is the value and dignity of the comman man, the value and dignity of the people. . . . America knows that the common man has a right to the "pursuit of happiness"; the pursuit of the elementary conditions and possessions which are the prerequisites of a free life, and the denial of which, suffered by such multitudes, is a horrible wound in the flesh of humanity; the pursuit of the higher possessions of culture and the spirit. . . . Here heroism is required, not to overcome tragedy, but to bring to a successful conclusion the formidable adventure begun in this country with the Pilgrim Fathers and the pioneers, and continued in the great days of the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary War [Reflections on America].

This being true, it may be asked what the implications are for the conduct of foreign policy. How do these principles affect the day-by-day carrying out of the aims and purposes of society and the response to successive crises? To what extent will policymakers be able to implement the higher ends that are enshrined in the founding statements that generations of Americans have embraced?

My answer is: to a greater degree than we have done in the recent past. I am, of course, aware of the constraints that affect hard-pressed officials in our government and result from the limitations of American power and influence in the world. We must be on guard against the risks of posing as the "world's policeman"; we cannot achieve our purposes immediately everywhere in the world through coercion and force of arms. As President Carter said in his address to the Conference of NATO countries in London: "America's concern for human rights does not reflect a desire to impose our particular political or social arrangements on any other country. It is, rather, an expression of the most deeply felt values of the American people. We want the world to know where we stand" (*New York Times*, May 11, 1977). Such constraints are especially great in our relationships with the governments of world powers, such as the Soviet Union, whose very existence depends on their claim they must resist interference in their domestic affairs. Changes here will be gradual, and our interests may sometimes be served as much by private as by public initiatives. Such governments consider the protection of public order

and state security more important than the acceptance, for example, of a foreign interpretation of the meaning of human rights. Involved is an ancient debate that went on between Russia and the United States in the years preceding the First World War and led to a deterioration of relations between them. Because the United Nations is an international organization of sovereign states, the Charter provides that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" (Article 2, Paragraph 7).

At the same time, the day has passed when it is good policy to ignore gross violations of human rights, the unique origin of the United States, and its special obligations in domestic and international affairs. The Declaration of Independence and other basic American documents define the moral and political purposes of the nation both in domestic and foreign policy. It is the duty of the American President to proclaim and uphold those principles that are the foundation of the Republic. Few states have comparable obligations. The ideas expressed in the Declaration were a major political force in the eighteenth century, and they remain revolutionary ideas today in many regions of the world. It is worth remembering, in President Carter's words at Notre Dame University: "The great democracies are not free because they are strong and prosperous . . . they are strong and prosperous because they are free. . . . Our spirit of confidence is spreading. Together our democracies can help to shape the wider architecture of global cooperation" (*New York Times*, May 23, 1977).

The question remains: How far should or can an administration go in advocating human rights and fundamental freedoms in other countries without hurting American national interests? The answer is a matter of prudential judgment. We must acknowledge that human rights are interpreted differently in particular countries and that the number of countries ruled by military dictators or other despotic regimes has increased. In these countries the dictator may impose a moral standard or the lack of it that defines the meaning of human rights. It is not a simple matter to know what the United States can do under these circumstances. The United States, to quote President Carter at Notre Dame again, cannot "conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral maxims. We live in a world that is imperfect and will always be imperfect, a world that is complex and will always be complex."

Yet authoritarian nations presume to enjoy the benefits of the world community; they are part of an interdependent world in which they must have both rights and duties. Most are members of the United Nations and some have ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

covenants of Human Rights. On this basis they have not hesitated to criticize countries such as Israel and South Africa while conveniently overlooking the failings of others. All nations have common needs in the areas of environment, science and technology, and human and material resources. Increasing public recognition of interdependence has created a basis for action. The present world community of fear, or, in Winston S. Churchill's phrase, of mutual terror, gives men time to develop constructive ideas and methods for the settlement of conflicts, peaceful change, and cooperation for the universal good. However, time may run out earlier than we think; and without acceptance of a moral framework and agreement on ends and permissible means, catastrophic conflicts may be unavoidable. Reform of the existing international system and the achievement of a sound basis for peaceful resolution of conflicts awaits the attainment of some higher degree of moral unity. The European state system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries functioned with some success because a moral consensus existed on certain important matters. We will not know to what extent compatible moral standards exist on a world scale until we explore them as fully as we do comparative military strength. This calls for more, not less, attention to human rights in countries around the world, not so much to condemn shortcomings as to recognize and affirm standards for a better life. As President Carter also said at Notre Dame: "It is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody. . . . For us to ignore this . . . would be to lose influence and moral authority in the world."

Also needed is a more determined effort to bring nuclear weapons under control. We live in a world in which overkill is fact, not rhetoric, and some nations possess far more than the number of weapons needed to destroy the others. It is proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States join in a comprehensive test ban treaty and that limits be drawn reducing the number of ICBMs below the level of previous agreements. As with human rights, the road to success in arms control is likely to be a long and arduous one, with setbacks along the way. It is vital that we test and discover the diplomatic approaches most likely to yield success. American officials should be prepared to report the results of their negotiations, but this need not mean in every case "covenants openly arrived at" under the public spotlight. The end result is too important to foreclose any reasonable use of public or private diplomacy that gives promise of success. The goal is to end the strategic arms race, a "race that is not only dangerous . . . [but] morally deplorable" (the President's Notre Dame speech). We want, in the President's words: "reciprocal stability, parity and security . . . a freeze on further modernization

and continuing substantial reduction of strategic weapons . . . a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, a prohibition against chemical warfare, no attack capability against space satellites and arms limitations in the Indian Oceans . . . [and] joint steps with all nations toward eliminating nuclear weapons completely from our arsenals of death."

Finally, the United States has a responsibility born of its traditions and their Judeo-Christian roots to help others in need. In our early history this impulse was expressed in religious missionary movements; in our time foreign assistance efforts are secularized forms of a deep-rooted commitment of the American people. Not by accident, the concept of service to others is especially strong in grass roots America and undergirds the strong efforts of rural peoples and leaders of land-grant institutions to share their knowhow with counterparts in the developing countries. Foreign aid, however, is also rooted in the national interest; through assisting poorer nations to develop their capacities to meet the needs of their people in basic fields such as food, and health and education, foreign aid helps prepare people for peaceful and more productive lives. It also helps to draw nations together in common tasks and may reduce their sense of alienation and remoteness. It gives a framework for transfers of technology and skills without which the newer states may suffer delays in their development. "More than 100 years ago, Abraham Lincoln said that our nation could not exist half slave and half free. We know that a peaceful world cannot long exist one-third rich and two-thirds hungry," said President Carter.

Policies, therefore, are affected by the values people hold and the kind of a society they seek to build. American policies for human rights, arms control, and foreign assistance cannot be divorced from the historic goals of American society. It is not possible for Americans to speak in one way to each other and in another way to foreign peoples. Domestic and foreign policy are bound together inextricably, however we may try to separate them for purposes of discussion. This is the reason why any administration that wishes to turn American energies to world leadership must do so by remaining faithful to the principles of our founding in 1776 and 1787. Abandoning these values, we have little to offer other peoples except our power, and this they are likely to reject. For it is American aspirations in their deepest sense that give people hope, not our armaments or our economic growth. The value and dignity of every man and woman and the right to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness provide the best possible framework for reshaping the contours of foreign policy problems.

Applying Morality to Foreign Policy

Louis J. Halle

Many of us, asked to define morality, would have to respond by echoing St. Augustine's statement about time: "If no one asks me what it is, I know; if called upon to explain, I do not know."

It is easier to say what morality is *not*. According to the parable of the pharisee and the publican (Luke 18:10-14), morality is not what is represented by those who make an ostentatious display of it. This is to say that we should mistrust those politicians and publicists who advance their careers by exhibiting themselves as the representatives of morality, striking moralistic attitudes, and expressing indignation at the iniquity of others. We should mistrust those who, on the basis of self-righteousness, concern themselves exclusively with improving the morals of others. Indeed, we should mistrust the self-righteous. The morality they represent is a false morality. It is, in a word, pharisaism.

Whatever true morality may be in specific terms, we must be prepared to regard it as an ideal that, in the world as it is, remains largely unrealizable. For, in the world as it is, inescapable practical and humanitarian considerations simply forbid its full realization. If, for example, it is a valid moral principle that one should always speak truthfully, anyone who adhered to that principle literally and invariably, without regard for the consequences, would thereby cause all sorts of confusion, entailing unhappiness, bad feeling, and perhaps disaster. If we are wise and humane, if we want to promote or maintain harmony among men, then we will have imperative reasons to make exceptions in practice to rules of morality that we uphold in principle.

Abraham Lincoln was convinced that slavery was morally wrong. Yet, in debate with Stephen A. Douglas, he referred to the practical difficulties involved in getting rid of it, adding: "I surely will not blame [the Southern people] for not doing what I should not know how to do myself." Even after he had become president and the Civil War

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had broken out, Lincoln refrained for almost two years from issuing his Emancipation Proclamation. When he did so at last, he excepted from its provisions the slaves in certain border states that were represented by members of Congress whose political support he needed. The self-proclaimed representatives of morality won applause for themselves by denouncing him as one of the wicked, but the wisdom that comes only with the passage of historical time has at last preferred him to them, even on moral grounds.

If slavery is immoral, then it was immoral to except from the general emancipation the slaves in the border states. It was an injustice to them. One cannot imagine that Lincoln himself would have denied this. His judgment, however, was that the evil consequences of emancipating these particular slaves would have been greater than the evil of not doing so. As is the case with so many decisions in the realm of politics, the choice was not between good and evil but between alternative evils. In such a situation the most moral of persons can do no better than to choose what seems the least evil, although it calls down upon him the indignation of the pharisaical.

The fault, we may say, is with the world as it is, but this is the world in which morally responsible persons have to make their decisions. It is only the irresponsible who can gain credit for morality by advocating decisions appropriate to the world as it should be.

We are concerned here with the application of moral standards to the conduct of foreign relations in particular. It is in the field of foreign relations, then, that I shall choose my examples in what follows.

If only because most of us regard it as morally abhorrent for human beings deliberately to kill or maim each other, most of us regard the resort to international war as immoral. Pacifism, then, like the opposition to slavery, is the expression of a genuine, not a pharisaical, morality. And pacifism, in practice, has consistently included the advocacy of disarmament. If the killing or maiming of another is immoral, then one may logically regard the accumulation of weapons designed for the purpose as immoral.

Now take the situation in Britain and the United States during the 1930's. The threat of war was looming ever larger as Hitler, Mussolini, and the militaristic rulers of Japan embarked on a course of expansion and built up their military forces in open preparation for campaigns of conquest. As this threat increased, the advocates of peace and disarmament in Britain and America became increasingly active in their opposition to war or any preparation for war. Advertisements were placed in popular magazines to persuade the public of the horrors of war and the conse-

quent necessity of refraining from any preparation for it. Masses of students in the British and American universities took the so-called Oxford Peace Pledge, whereby they swore, in the hearing of the would-be aggressors, never to fight for their country. Public pressure was generated to prevent Britain or the United States from building up military forces and armaments to meet the growing menace. And all this was done in the name of a morality that, if sufficiently abstracted from real circumstances, could be regarded as genuine.

Today it is hard to doubt that this peace movement helped to bring on a war that might have been averted. At the same time that it encouraged Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese warlords, it contributed importantly to keeping Britain especially, but the United States as well, psychologically and physically disarmed, preventing them from taking such measures as would have deterred the entire course of aggression.

Today we know that if Britain and the United States had shown a readiness and determination to oppose Hitler, by military means if necessary, he would not have dared to invade the Rhineland in 1936. His projected course of aggression would have been stopped before it began. We now know that he was even prepared to retreat from the Rhineland after his invasion if that invasion had provoked a sufficiently determined opposition, backed with arms, by Britain and France. As late as 1938 Hitler could still have been dissuaded from invading Austria, without a shot being fired, by a determined and credible posture on the part of the Atlantic democracies. It was the pacifistic disposition of Britain and the United States, together with an associated demoralization of the French society, that enabled the three aggressor regimes to pursue with increasing momentum a course that would lead at last to the global war in which tens of millions of people were killed or maimed, in which the civilization associated with our morality was massively wrecked.

When the moment of truth came in 1939, revealing the world as it really is, those — with whatever few exceptions there may have been — who had taken the Oxford Peace Pledge in Britain had no hesitation in violating the oath they had taken in their innocence a few years before.

Again, as we look back on these years in historical perspective, we see how the choice confronting Britain and the United States was not, as the well-meaning pacifists believed, a choice between good and evil, but between a relatively small and an overwhelming evil. Again we see how the best alternative, as in the situation that confronted Lincoln, was the choice of the lesser evil that would forestall the greater one. Rearmament and a readiness to resist aggression by force, if immoral in principle, would never-

theless have forestalled war entirely. This, in the world as it is, would not have been a disservice to the cause of morality.

At this point we face a paradoxical question: whether it is in fact wrong to do what must be regarded as wrong in and by itself, when by doing it one obviates a greater wrong. The answer, surely, is that responsible moral judgment cannot overlook context and consequences.

A morally responsible person cannot, in his advocacy, disregard workability in the world as it is.

If we have had no world war since 1945, when nuclear arms first made their apperance, and if no great war is raging today, that is because the condition of mutual deterrence called a balance of power has come to prevail. Mutual deterrence keeps the peace. If anyone tells me that this is not a good enough foundation for peace, I can only answer that I must wish its retention until a better one has been found and established in its place.

Not only must we not wish to do away with the balance of power in the absence of a proved alternative, we must wish to stabilize it in the greatest degree possible, for the price of a failure to do so might be the transformation of the Northern Hemisphere into a radioactive desert. The objective of stabilizing the balance, while it can be promoted by arms control, is not compatible with the view that any reduction in armaments necessarily reduces the likelihood of war, while any augmentation increases it. Let me exemplify.

At the end of the 1950's the mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union, depending as it did on their respective nuclear panoplies, was highly unstable for a starkly simple reason. Each side had grounds for believing that a surprise nuclear attack by one against the nuclear panoply of the other could instantly eliminate that panoply and, with it, any power of retaliation. Therefore, whichever side struck first, taking the other by surprise, would disarm the other, rendering it helpless and forcing its unconditional surrender as an alternative to having its cities destroyed. This meant that in a time of mounting crisis, as tensions between the two sides rose, the issue would depend on which struck first. Each, regarding hesitation as suicidal, would undertake, in the language of the Wild West, to beat the other to the draw.*

*While it would have been constitutionally impossible for the United States to have launched a surprise attack out of a sky undarkened by the clouds of war, one may plausibly imagine such circumstances as the outbreak of local fighting, rapidly mounting in intensity, on the approaches to Berlin. A point might quickly be reached at which either side, under the impulse of panic, felt that its survival depended on anticipating, by a first strike of its own, the alternative of a first strike by the other.

This alarming situation of instability was overcome, in the early 1960's, not by disarmament, but by its opposite. The increase and technical improvement of nuclear weapons systems, including their deployment in submarines, gave them a relative invulnerability to surprise attack that, because it allowed the means of retaliation to survive such an attack, was bound to deter one. So the danger of a deliberate surprise attack was, in effect, eliminated. No longer could either side afford to strike first. So peace was promoted, not by disarmament, but by an increase and improvement of armaments.

I cite this historical example simply to suggest that those who automatically identify disarmament with morality, as promoting peace, should think twice.

To avoid misunderstanding let me add that, when it comes to mutual deterrence and the balance of power, I do not discriminate in any fundamental way between one side and another. I think it not unlikely that in 1953, if the Soviet Union had been excessively weak, the United States would not have been deterred from pursuing the policy, advocated by Secretary Dulles on moralistic grounds, of liberating the satellites. This, in turn, would almost surely have led to political dislocations and a spreading chaos that eventuated in general war.

I here offer another instance of the problems that may arise when we try to equate with the prevention of war ideas of morality that have been conceived in abstraction.

From 1956 to 1960, during the period of instability to which I have just referred, the United States regularly sent its U-2 spy planes over the Soviet Union at high altitudes to locate military installations and report on military activities. Presumably such planes would have been able to detect any preparations for a surprise attack on the United States in time to give warning. We may be sure that, at the same time, a Soviet system of espionage operating inside the United States was alert to detect any preparations for surprise attack by the United States on the Soviet Union. This mutual espionage contributed to the preservation of the peace, because the observations of the spies on either side, showing that the other was not preparing a surprise attack, enabled each to remain calm and restrained. If such observations had not been available, each side might have been the victim of panic-making rumors that would have impelled it to feel that its survival depended on striking before the other was able to realize some rumored intention of doing so itself.

Each side, moreover, knew of the other's espionage, and to the extent that either might have expected such espionage to provide sufficient warning of a surprise attack it would have been deterred from undertaking one.

However, in 1960, when an American U-2, illegally violating another country's airspace, was shot down in the middle of the Soviet Union, many moralists in the West were shocked to learn that such espionage by the United States had been going on, for they regarded it as both immoral and incompatible with the advancement of the cause of peace.

Peace is more secure today, and the prospects of arms control are better, to the extent that the Soviet Union and the United States, through their espionage (in which satellites have replaced spy planes), can each be sure of what armaments the other possesses.

I now come to another moral question that has been a subject of debate among us ever since President Wilson, in 1913, refused to recognize a new government in Mexico because it had come to power by violent rather than constitutional means. Since that time, an important part of the public in our Western democracies has considered that it is morally improper for their governments to maintain normally courteous and cooperative relations with other governments regarded as morally disreputable. I shall come to the question, which I do not prejudge, whether this does or does not represent pharisaism on a national rather than an individual scale. What concerns me at this point is, again, the question of workability.

In the period immediately after World War II the United States Government, on grounds of morality, embarked briefly on a policy of not dealing with those governments in Latin America that it identified as "dictatorships or disreputable governments." In pursuance of this policy, and to the accompaniment of applause from the American public, it officially broke diplomatic relations with the governments of Colonel Perón in Argentina and General Somoza in Nicaragua. I say "officially" because, since there was indispensable business to conduct with those governments, it did not close down its embassies in their respective capitals, and its diplomats merely used the back doors, so to speak, of the foreign offices and presidential palaces instead of the front doors. The hypocrisy was patent, and after the American public had had time to forget about the applauded moral gesture, Washington was glad to find what excuses it could quietly to restore normal diplomatic relations.

One question that arises in connection with this ludicrous episode is why the United States did not, as a matter of consistency, break diplomatic relations with all other "dictatorships or disreputable governments." If the mere fact that they were dictatorial or disreputable made it immoral to maintain diplomatic relations with the governments of Argentina and Nicaragua, why was it not equally

immoral to maintain diplomatic relations with Stalin's government in Russia and a host of others as well?

It suffices to say that, on any strict interpretation, this moral principle would have required the United States to break relations with almost all the Latin American governments and, in the rest of the world, with all except those of the old British Commonwealth, the Scandinavian countries, and a few others in Western Europe. (We may note that, although the most notoriously cruel and corrupt dictatorship in Latin America was that of Generalissimo Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, the United States did not break relations with it because it needed its consent for the maintenance of a satellite-tracking station on its soil.)

From 1913 to 1970, when the United States moved to establish diplomatic relations with the government in Peking, nonrecognition, or the refusal to engage in diplomatic relations with governments regarded as morally unworthy, has repeatedly proved to be impracticable. One has the impression that the lesson has at last been learned. However, the moralistic principle behind the policy of nonrecognition continues to be manifested, albeit in other forms. There is a persistent public demand that the Government of the United States do something about objectionable policies pursued by other governments entirely within the area of their domestic jurisdictions. Occasionally reports of torture by the police in Brazil or some other country provokes a demand by the moralists that the United States restrict itself, at the least, to coldly formal relations with the government of that particular country, refusing to enter into or to continue such cooperative projects as suggest friendly relations. There are, however, practical difficulties. I shall mention only one, which is that the police of the overwhelming majority of the governments in the world regularly practice torture too horrible to contemplate, although the fact is kept secret in most cases. It is hardly practicable for the Government of the United States to investigate police behavior in all countries, in which case the proposed policy would probably require it to maintain formal but noncooperative relations with all but a select few. Alternatively, would it not be cynical for it to adopt such a policy in its relations with, say, Brazil, but not in its relations with some Arab country that supplied it with needed petroleum, or some African country that might otherwise turn to the Soviet Union?

I think it proper and useful that the nongovernmental elements in American society, including those who comment in the news media, freely express their abhorrence of such a practice as police torture, whether in the United States or in other countries. I do not, however, think it proper or practicable for the government to do so. And I note in passing that the demand of student and intellectual

groups that it do so almost always (with the latter-day exception of the Soviet Union) has reference to the practice of torture or arbitrary punishment by right-wing regimes, its practice by left-wing regimes being disregarded. One must ask why, if such practices are wrong in the one case, they are not wrong in the other.

I have taken the practice of torture as one example of the kind of situation in which Washington is called upon to concern itself with what goes on within the domestic jurisdiction of another country. The basic problem this raises is also represented by the demand that the Government of the United States concern itself actively with official racial discrimination in other countries, of which the outstanding example is the Republic of South Africa.

As a believer in equal opportunity for all, I am opposed to racial discrimination in principle. But I would also, as a practical matter, favor whatever policy seemed most likely to minimize human suffering and destruction. I would hesitate to pursue an abstract virtue at the price of lacerated flesh and blood. I have no doubt that the Government of South Africa, in which a small white minority rules an immense black majority, is confronted by a dilemma that no morally responsible person should allow himself to overlook. The black majority is, as yet, at a lower level of education than the white minority, and to that extent may be less prepared to exercise political responsibility wisely. Insofar as it has accumulated bitterness against the white minority, which has exploited it for centuries, it would be tempted to use the political power it acquired to punish and perhaps destroy that minority — which, after all, consists of men, women, and children essentially like the majority and like ourselves, who suffer pain as we all do, who bleed when they are cut in just the same way as we all do. These men, women, and children have inherited an historical record that they did not themselves make, and to my mind it is an abhorrent moral doctrine that the sins of the fathers should be visited on the children. I would, as I say, hesitate in advocating, on grounds of abstract moral principle, any move in South Africa that might lead to chaos marked by bloodshed and, perhaps, genocide.

My point is that I do not think the American people and Government are in a position to decide what the South African Government should do within the area of its domestic jurisdiction. I know that I, myself, am not in such a position. Under the circumstances it seems to me that the United States, which has enough problems of its own to solve, should be thankful that the domestic problems of South Africa are not its business.

For the most part, the American people and the American Government are simply too unacquainted with distant

foreign societies to prescribe their domestic conduct and the solution of their domestic problems. Let me dwell for a moment on the widespread American assumption that the accepted principles of conduct within the American jurisdiction should properly be applied within the jurisdictions of all other countries as well.

What are conceived to be basic human rights under the common law may have no place under the Roman law that prevails in Scotland and in all the liberal democracies of the European continent. I have lived a good part of my life in Switzerland, enjoying the freedom that we rightly associate with that country no less than with the United States. But the common law grants the individual citizen certain rights (e.g., habeas corpus) that he does not have under the Roman law. In general terms the oppression of the state is as severely limited in Switzerland as in the United States, but particular norms, based on different traditions, are different. It would be more than a mistake, an egregious infringement of Switzerland's national autonomy, for the United States to concern itself officially with the administration of justice within the Swiss jurisdiction, insisting on the institution by Switzerland of norms and procedures alien to the Swiss tradition, however proper to the American.

If this is so in the case of a liberal democracy older than that of the United States, what shall we say of an attempt by Washington to impose its norms on the Chinese or the Russians? It is not just that the Chinese and the Russians have each a millennial tradition that is altogether different from the American, entailing in each case an entirely different view of the individual's place in society. The crux of the matter is that the American people and the bureaucracy in Washington are quite unable to comprehend, in any understanding way, these cultures — cultures that only the most sensitive and thoughtful of individual scholars, those who have lived long in China or Russia, are able to appreciate. It follows that Washington can only do damage to itself and others, defeating its own purpose, if it should presume to act as a sort of legislator for these countries, prescribing their norms of conduct.

The United States would not accept such interference in its own domestic jurisdiction on the part of China, Russia, or any other country. But it cannot properly insist that they mind their own business, if it is not willing to do likewise.

The widespread opinion in the United States that it knows what is best for the rest of the world, that it knows best how to solve the problems of other countries, has caused it to become dangerously overextended since the war, both morally and intellectually, with consequences manifested most dramatically in Vietnam.

On this point, then, I conclude that the United States should adhere to a traditional principle of diplomacy, which is that, where its own nationals or legitimate national interests are not directly involved, it cannot properly concern itself with matters that belong entirely within the domestic jurisdictions of other governments. And it should not let itself be tricked into abandoning this principle by claims, so easily made and generally so specious, that a foreign government's domestic behavior is, in itself, a threat to the peace.

I have been primarily concerned here with arguments based on practical grounds. We should not overlook, however, the possibility that a concern, ostensibly justified by morality, for how other countries should deal with their domestic problems may represent pharisaism. National pharisaism generally has an element of innocence that personal pharisaism lacks. For example, the traditional belief of Americans that Jeffersonian Democracy, identified with political morality, is the best form of government for all peoples everywhere represents the ignorance of parochialism no less than the vainglory of self-righteousness. But the American people themselves have not, of late years, manifested a notable moral sensibility at home or a conspicuous aversion to corruption. It has been disturbing to discover that the ostentatious reenactment, before forty thousand cheering people in Texas last October, of the destruction of Hiroshima by an atom bomb (an event that killed over a hundred thousand men, women, and children, permanently impairing the health of tens of thousands more) apparently aroused no conspicuous protest among the American people — not even among those Americans whom we regard as the more enlightened members of the society. It is disturbing to note how a representative part of the American public sees nothing seriously wrong when a congressman whom it finds personally attractive uses public funds to support his mistress. I would not advocate, however, that the Swiss nation, which would have been more shocked by this if it had occurred in its own jurisdiction, take account of it in its dealings with the United States.

My own basic belief, underlying everything I have here written, is that morality begins at home. Any individual will find he has enough to do if he concerns himself with his own morality only, and he is likely to do more good in the world by setting a tacit example, as Abraham Lincoln did, than by loudly undertaking the moral reformation of others. This seems to me to apply to national societies no less than to individuals. The United States has, in the past, set examples that have permanently benefited the world. One would wish to see it do so still. A concentration

on its own standards applied to the conduct of its own affairs is to be preferred, alike from the moral and the practical point of view, to a preoccupation with the morality of others.

The purpose of this essay has been to open a discussion on ethics and foreign policy. Within its limits I have not felt myself able to set forth specific rules of public morality — a sort of Ten Commandments — and perhaps I could not do so anyway. I have put forward one general principle, which is that a national society, as such, should refrain from concerning itself with the domestic morals of other national societies. Another general principle by which I would wish us to be governed is that humanitarian considerations should prevail over any ideological dictates whatsoever — and here I have in mind our civilization's long record, ever since the wars of religion, of brutalities based on the false logic of the Manichaeism that is at the heart of every ideology, supporting the myth that some particular category of persons (the Jews or the Germans, the bourgeoisie or the Communists) represents a satanic evil and that its members, since they only appear to partake of our common humanity, may be chastised or destroyed without compunction in the name of morality.

Had I attempted to formulate here specific rules of public morality, it would have been in terms of a vison of the good life that I would have hoped was not only personal to me but widely shared. Even so, I would have had to recognize that whatever rules I formulated could not have been applied by a morally responsible government without regard for the practical consequences that such application might be expected to have on human flesh and blood in the world as it is. This has always been, and it remains, the dilemma that those who bear moral responsibility have to face. Other contributors to this discussion may, as I hope, provide more positive guidance than I have felt myself able to offer, but they will not, I think, be able to overlook this dilemma..

Commentary

Human Rights and Foreign Policy

John C. Bennett

Father Hesburgh's witness to the vitality of the best in American traditions and institutions is, in my judgment, true and heartening. But it applies more to our constitutional system that it does to our economic system. The witness of Americans to human rights is flawed by the official and also popular callousness in regard to chronic poverty, to the decay of our cities, and to the extremes of inequality that remain. Yet our country is a large area in which there is freedom of dissent, in which the press exercises freedom to ferret out the facts about abuses of power, in which courts often show great independence and integrity, in which all the political powers are under the judgment of a constitution that sets high standards of fairness and increasingly protects the rights of the powerless. I say "increasingly" because we know that it is true that people who are poor and members of minorities can still, if they become entangled with the police and the prison system, suffer much injustice. There remain many opportunities for voluntary groups to organize and to get a hearing about such cases of injustice. There seems to me to be a remarkable openness in our country for criticism of power and for change. This should be affirmed while we take advantage of it and do our criticizing.

These realities in our country do give President Carter's raising of the standard for human rights considerable persuasive power. Our country has from the beginning set a good example of representative government, but in previous periods we have not set as good an example of respecting human rights as we do now. Certainly we did not do so before the legal victories of the civil rights movement, during the period of Joseph McCarthy's power, and even during the period of strong pressures against antiwar dissent while the Indochina war was being fought. Carter has recognized that we need to be judged by the standard that

he has raised. I think that he may have made some mistakes; perhaps his writing Sakharov was one. However, the combination of Carter's initiative and the pressures on governments in the Helsinki Agreement have created a new level of ferment and hope about human rights. It is good to have the best in the American and Western vision of human dignity presented with such persuasive power.

I do not want what I shall say now to detract from this affirmation. There are glaring inconsistencies to overcome and there are failures to understand nations that do not give as high priority to the rights of the individual as we do, and these should be emphasized.

1. Already our government has attemped to overcome the inconsistency in our habit of condemning the denials of human rights on the left and of being tolerant of them on the right. The denial or reduction of aid to repressive right-wing regimes such as those in Chile and Brazil and several other Latin American countries is in the right direction. Also there is a changed attitude toward Southern Africa. Yet there remains a tendency to be too complacent about repression in countries that are anti-Communist and important to our side such as South Korea, Iran, Indonesia, Taiwan, the Philippines. What is the state of human rights in Saudi Arabia, a country we so much favor? For so long we have favored many right-wing governments that care neither about human rights for individuals nor about improving the economic condition of the majority of their people. Left-wing regimes, which come in for most of our criticism, do a great deal in terms of economic justice for most of their people. But economic justice has not had a high priority in our evaluation of other countries.

2. There needs to be a better understanding of the reasons for the trend toward authoritarian governments in most of the world. Many nations have the problem of establishing governments that can cope with the poverty that results from centuries of stagnation and oppression, and they have to do this without previous experience of self-government. They may have to contend with deep tribal or ethnic conflicts or they may have within their countries powerful groups that had opposed the revolutionary changes on which the present governments are based. Contrast this with our founders, who had had experience of self-government before the revolution and whose main opponents were three thousand miles away and half-hearted at that. They did not have to deal with massive poverty, and resources seemed unlimited. The American good fortune at the points where other nations have most difficult struggles should always be in our minds. I was glad when Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said that we should avoid hubris when we speak to other nations.

3. It is time to take stock of the anticommunism that has dominated American attitudes and policies for so long. I have never thought that communism had anything to offer to the industrialized nations of the West, which have had successful democratic experience — the very nations, Marx believed, in which communism would first gain power. Stalinism was a loathesome perversion of communism, which in part accounts for the depth of American hostility toward it. There are countries in which it is doubtful that any movement other than communism could have overcome the deeply entrenched and stubborn powers of the privileged few. Our country has had no alternative to communism to offer in these situations. Why should we have always assumed that communism was worse for another country than the continuation of generations of traditional forms of cruel oppression involving massive poverty and neglect of most of the population, with no hope of anything better? Can we not say what is almost never said, that in some situations communism has been, on balance, a constructive change? I think that this judgment is implicit in the predominantly positive attitude toward the Peoples Republic of China that is now widespread among us. (A similar positive attitude toward Cuba is gaining ground.) Yet if we had had our way ten years or more ago, China would have been thrown back into its former poverty and corruption, and it might have suffered from anarchy or at least dismemberment. It is fortunate that we did not have our way.

The change in orientation that is needed would be helped along if we took more seriously the diversity among Communist regimes and parties. We know in general that the international Communist monolith is broken, and we have acted on this knowledge in the case of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and most recently China, but the idea that communism involves belief in an unchanging absolute still influences policy. As long ago as 1961 the then Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski said of the early stages of this diversity that it would result in "a gradual relativization of the formerly absolutistic ideology" (*Foreign Affairs*, April, 1961). This development has taken place on a large scale since then. We should make the most of the diversities among Communist nations and regimes on a wide spectrum, with Cambodia and North Korea at one end and Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary at the other end, and with Western European parties beyond that.

This diversity and the relativization of the absolute that goes with it may offer the best hope for human rights among Communist nations. There is evidence of a great erosion of ideological faith in the Soviet Union. The ideology that still controls the worldview of its leaders causes them to be somewhat rigid in their perceptions about other nations

and fearful that competition between ideas will undermine their power, but they show no signs of having a contagious revolutionary vision that could overcome the diversity among Communist nations and parties by persuasion. They can use their tanks with sad results, but, when they do so, they arouse great resentment among both Communists and non-Communists.

4. It seems to me that the deepest issue that we have to face arises when we find that there are moral values we believe to have a universal claim which are alien to the histories and cultures of other nations. This was put with great force by John K. Fairbank in discussing the American ideas about the rights of the individual in contrast to views natural to Chinese culture quite apart from communism. He writes: "One flaw in a human rights foreign policy is that human rights are not as pervasive as human righteousness. . . . Confucian morality stressed duties, not rights, as the glue of social harmony, and individualism is still a dirty word in the People's Republic. . . . Chinese individuals relate to state and society in a different way. . . . Whether the Chinese can learn anything moral from us, beyond the negative examples they now see in our streets and media, is quite uncertain. Since they have lived crowded longer than we, perhaps we have more to learn from them in both material ecology and self-discipline" (*New York Review of Books*, May 12, 1977).

I shall make two suggestions about this issue. The first is that differences in cultures should not inhibit those of us who have been formed by Western religious and political traditions from seeking to embody more fully in our national life and policies those moral values whose claim we recognize or from witnessing to them on a world scale. Readers of these words surely agree that to inhibit the expression of deeply held personal convictions, to bring pressure to cause a person to falsify what is seen to be true, is to deny something essential in the being of that person. We should not set up limits as to which parts of the world can understand and accept such a conviction. There is a conviction that others may arrive at in spite of their histories: that no society can afford in the long run to silence all criticism or to falsify such things as the findings of scientists because to do so may cause it to rush headlong into consequences that would be recognized as catastrophic regardless of cultural conditioning.

My second suggestion is that in different situations it may be well to emphasize different approaches to human rights. For example, in Latin America the Church still has a great deal of leverage, and it is committed not only to religious liberty but also to the right of all people to be free from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, free from torture. In the case of the Soviet Union, where science has

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so much prestige, the freedom of the scientist may be easiest to achieve. The influence of international science on Soviet scientists may be most effective. Scientific freedom cannot be separated from other forms of the freedom of the mind. There is great sensitivity in many parts of the world about racial discrimination and there is a growing concern about sexist discrimination. Here are areas where structures and policies can be loosened up, making way for other rights. I have referred to torture. Is this not something about which governments, regardless of cultural conditioning and ideology, can be put on the moral defensive before a very wide public? People who may have no belief in the rights of the individual in general may be shocked and repelled when they learn about their government's use of torture.

International cooperation in these areas is of great importance. We need as large an area in the world as possible where facts and ideas reverberate. Scientists, religious bodies, jurists, artists, journalists, people concerned about particular universal causes such as peace and the protection of the environment need to keep a worldwide conversation going. Governments can help, but sometimes they may be too heavy-handed and voluntary groups will be able to get better results. The human rights that we enjoy in Western countries did not come only because of successful advocacy of human rights in general. They came because all sorts of people under difficult situations took up the right to speak and to act. They worshipped, spoke up, petitioned, took risks by disobeying authorities, went into exile, and the patterns of activity for which they struggled came to be recognized as rights.

Ethics and Foreign Policy: An Approach to the Problem

George F. Kennan

1. Foreign policy is conducted by governments, as a function of their governmental responsibility; and it must serve the purposes of government generally.
2. The governing of human beings is not a moral exercise. It is a practical function, made necessary, regrettably, by the need for order in social relationships and for a collective discipline to control the behavior of that large majority of mankind who are too weak and selfish to control their own behavior usefully on the basis of individual judgment and conscience.

3. Government, particularly democratic government, is an agent and not a principal; and no more than any other agent can it attempt to substitute itself for the conscience of the principal.

4. This last would be true even if the people at large were an individual. Still more is it true when the principal is not an individual but, as in the case of the American people, a great mass of individuals. The government could undertake to express and to implement the moral impulses of so great a mass of people only if there were a high degree of consensus among them on such questions as: what is good and what is bad? and to what extent is it the duty of American society to make moral judgments on behalf of others and to improve them from the standpoint of those judgments? Such consensus would be difficult to achieve even if we were dealing with a highly homogeneous population, with firm and unanimously accepted concepts of an ethical nature as well as of the duties and powers of the state. In the case of a polyglot assemblage of people such as our own it would be quite impossible. If our government should set out to pursue moral purposes in foreign policy, on what would it base itself? Whose outlooks, philosophy, religious concepts would it choose to express? Imbedded in our population are hundreds of different traditions, beliefs, assumptions, and reactions in this field. Are we to assume that the government knows what is right and what is wrong, has imparted this knowledge to the people at large, and obtained their mandate to proceed to bring about the triumph of what is right on a worldwide scale?

5. We speak of "human rights" as some sort of an absolute good, with regard to which all of us would be in agreement. But really? Are rights something conceived to exist without regard to the behavior of the individual who enjoys them? Is there a class of human beings that may be said to have rights without responsibilities? To my mind liberty is definable only in terms of the restraints it implies and accepts. And human rights, too, operate only within a framework of discipline and restraint. But if you talk about discipline and restraint, you are talking about something that enters into the responsibility of government. Do we, then, in undertaking to decide what "rights" should exist in other countries, propose to tell the peoples and governments of those countries what restraints should also exist? And can one, then, try to tell another country what rights ought to be observed in its society without telling it what sort of government it ought to have?

6. I must question the absolute character of human rights, generally. We ourselves recognize their relative quality when we define them differently in time of war than we do in time of peace. I would know of no criterion for determining what they ought to be other than their general utility in

assuring the higher social aims of a given society — in our case, the achievement of humane, decent, and orderly social conditions. But is it not conceivable that these requirements could vary greatly from one society to another — that what would be required for this purpose in a relatively self-disciplined population with a long tradition of self-government might be something quite different from that which would be required for another type of society? And if so, have we any right to impose our concepts of what these rights ought to be, if only by implication, on other societies? Must not the answer to this question be found in the working of *their* systems for arriving at consensus or acceptance in such matters — not *ours*?

And if all this is so, was not the process gone through at Helsinki, in the working out of the language of the respective documents on such matters, in reality an unsound and presumptuous one?

7. It is hard for me to see, finally, how human rights can be separated from the institutions and practices of government generally. The requirements of the Soviet Government in this respect are obviously different from our own; and in general an authoritarian political system implies a different definition of human rights than a democratic one.

But if we are to recognize this, do we not also have to recognize, then, that there is no reason to suppose, on the strength of observable historical phenomena, that democracy is the natural form of government for most of mankind? — that, on the contrary, it is something arising from specific and quite unusual environmental conditions affecting only a small portion of humanity, primarily northwestern Europe and its offshoots in other continents? And if so, is not the effort to impose upon others *our* concepts of human rights not only unjustified but quixotic? And is there not always a punishment for the persistent pursuit of quixotic aims?

Foreign Policy: The Context of Aspirations

John P. Armstrong

Father Hesburgh's essay comes from the heart; Professor Halle's from the mind. The first is an eloquent statement of our ideas; the second deals with how to attain them, and how difficult it is to apply them to international politics.

Using impressive examples, Halle demonstrates how nebulous the concept of morality is. And he stresses the

point that morality must always be considered in the light of context and consequences. Hesburgh takes the position that "The Declaration of Independence and other basic American documents define the moral . . . purposes of the nation both in domestic and foreign policy. It is the duty of the American President to proclaim and uphold those principles. . . ." But he is vague indeed about how one would apply these principles to a specific situation.

Halle's approach is coldly analytical; Hesburgh's is historical and hortatory. It is not until page 13 of 17 pages that Hesburgh reaches the twentieth century. And it is bad history as far as foreign policy is concerned, but it *is* the "history" that most Americans believed in prior to Pearl Harbor, based on the premise that what happened in Europe was no concern of ours. Moreover, it is sanitized American history. Reading Hesburgh one would never know how abysmally the American people failed to live up to our moral aspirations after 1783. It was not slavery but secession that brought on the Civil War, and Halle makes the point that emancipation was not total but carefully selective due to political considerations.

Our treatment of the Indian tribes, our conflicts with England, France, Spain, and Mexico, our entire expansion from sea to sea, these things most certainly were not undertaken with any moral aspirations as our guide. Nor was this expansion a gift from God, as was implied in our hypocritical slogan of Manifest Destiny. But you wouldn't know that from reading Hesburgh.

I should like to see an analysis by Halle of the period between 1783 and 1789 that Hesburgh dwells on. I think Halle would find that what was going on then was an international war between thirteen sovereign states. And it took diplomacy and some very wise political minds to bring into effect first a confederation and later a nation. And in making this possible, the Framers had to make what Hesburgh would call immoral compromises. The condoning of slavery is a glaring example.

Halle would also agree that expansion took place under the umbrella of the Treaty of Vienna, which established a balance of power on the Continent that lasted for a hundred years, in spite of the fact that Europe was experiencing a profound change in the principles of legitimacy. That balance, in effect, gave us a license to do what we wished on this continent without any serious danger of intervention from abroad. And we took advanage of it — to the hilt — without acknowledging its existence.

As Halle points out, the American people should be grateful for the balance of power system and embrace it for the moral principles upon which it is based: peace and the continued existence of nations too small and powerless to defend themselves.

Hesburgh also fails to take into account the vast differences in the moral principles of the world's many religions. Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and traditional (primitive) religions are all based on a god or gods of one sort or another, but their ideas of good and evil differ to some extent and often a very wide extent.

I will cite two minor examples of how cultural differences, often stemming from religion, influence our attitudes. Some years ago I had a Sino-Indonesian friend, educated in Dutch schools in Indonesia and university in Holland. His Catholicism, sincere enough, was but a veneer on Confucianism tinged with a Javanese belief in spirits. We spent many rewarding hours discussing our cultural differences. One day he summed them up by saying, "If a stone fell on the roof, you would ask, 'What caused that?' I would ask, 'How have I offended the gods?' "

Another Indonesian friend, a Sumatran who won his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in the United States, refused over several years to accept the individual as the basic unit of society. He steadfastly maintained that it was the family. And he had done his homework in American history and political theory.

Finally, there is the question of what role morality could or should play in foreign policy. Halle sees no objection to proclaiming our moral aspirations to the world as long as we know and they know that they are *only* aspirations. We may and should, however, note with some pride our progress in attaining moral goals, e.g., our treatment of the blacks and the changing role of women in our society. But our main efforts, as Halle insists, should be devoted to bringing about social and economic justice in the United States, teaching by our example, rather than by preaching. Most especially, he says, our foreign policy — recognition, treaties, foreign aid, etc. — should not, except in very special circumstances, be based on our somewhat parochial views of what is good and what is evil.

Father Hesburgh's mind-set is in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson, who never understood the origins of World War I or the role the European balance of power played in America's march westward.

Professor Halle, on the other hand, is in the tradition of the architects of the Treaty of Vienna (Talleyrand and Metternich, among others) and, more recently, Lincoln, Bismarck (until the Kaiser ousted him), Walter Lippmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Thompson. Halle makes a strong, well-reasoned case for this approach to foreign policy. For him perfect morality is never possible. It is always a question of choosing the lesser evil because we are human. "Responsible moral judgment cannot overlook context and consequences." He urges us re-

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peatedly to tailor our policies to fit the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.

Throughout his essay he stresses that a clear distinction must be made between what sort of conditions in other countries should concern us and what sort should not. His basic belief is that morality begins at home.

I find little in Professor Halle's essay to criticize and much to applaud. He can draw upon Father Hesburgh's admirable statement of our moral aspirations for guidance in dealing with the world as it is. I hope that on another occasion Father Hesburgh will climb down from his pulpit long enough to show us how we might apply his moral principles to Professor Halle's world.

Taken together, these essays provide much food for thought; separately only Professor Halle's can stand on its own.

An Ethical Base for Foreign Policy

Philip C. Jessup

I share the optimism of Father Hesburgh, but I would point to experience beyond the borders of the United States as well as to those attributes for which we can be grateful and those of which we may be proud. We have been laggard in accepting the obligations that should have succeeded Eleanor Roosevelt's triumphant negotiation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Europe has created its operating intergovernmental system for enforcing respect for human rights. At its 127th session in May, 1977, the European Commission on Human Rights considered two hundred individual applications, declaring six new applications admissible and inviting governments to present observations on twelve applications. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled in favor of numerous applications, and its judgments have been respected. These European governments have, so to speak, internationalized human rights and refute the notion of Mr. Halle and the Soviets that human rights are matters of purely domestic concern. Other states that have signed the U.N. treaties on human rights have also accepted their international character — I mention the stronger cases, but acceptance of the United Nations Charter is itself a denial of the contention that human rights are not matters of international concern. I agree wih the statements of President Carter that Father Hesburgh quotes.

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I regret to differ with Mr. Halle, an old friend and colleague whose great abilities I admire, but differ I do. First, let me agree wholeheartedly with his castigation of the hypocrites. I would cite in support of Halle's views the invocation by President Teddy Roosevelt of the biblical injunction that we should not point to the mote in a neighbor's eye if we ignore the beam in our own.

I believe Halle misconstrues the history of the movement that opposed American entry into World War II. The trouble was not with moralists or "isolationists." Close to an anniversary year celebrating Charles Lindbergh's exploits, I urge Halle to read his *Wartime Journals* and the recently published biographies of Lindbergh. Lindbergh urged the British, the French, and the American governments to arm themselves, especially their air forces, to meet the German forces he saw building up. Many America Firsters believed, as the European world caught fire, that the United States should arm itself. England and France were laggard, but not as a result of the Oxford Peace Pledge.

Like other so-called realists, Halle concentrates on the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are not now engaged in a "great war." He is indifferent to wars raging in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. I disagree entirely with his conclusion that it is "not unlikely" that the United States would have followed the Dulles policy of liberating the satellites if the Soviet Union had been weak in 1953. It is not true that it is "ludicrous" to break diplomatic relations or to leave an embassy in the hands of a chargé as a sign of displeasure. Though I agree with Halle about the falseness of Wilson's moralistic attitude toward Mexico, the use of various ways of indicating diplomatic displeasure is well established and often useful. These ways are surely better than the resort to armed force.

It is overgeneralization to attribute views and attitudes merely to "student and intellectual groups." I see no reason why the American Government cannot profit from the knowledge of intelligent, well-informed people to understand Asian and African countries. Again, I say that today many problems that a century ago might properly have been thought "purely domestic" are now matters of legitimate international concern and therefore part of the "business" of the United States. Though the Helsinki Agreements are definitely not legally binding, they are acknowledgments that human rights are suited to international concerns. I fear long residence abroad leads to some misappraisal of American phenomena. The American reaction to Watergate, to Nazism, to the KKK, and like horrors is far more vigorous and deep-seated than Halle believes. So in regard to political corruption of all kinds.

In my view an ethical base is essential to a successful foreign policy. Even President Theodore Roosevelt, hav-

ing warned of hypocrisy, declared in his annual message to Congress, December 6, 1904:

> We have plenty of sins of our own to war against, and under ordinary circumstances we can do more for the general uplifting of humanity by striving with heart and soul to put a stop to civil corruption, to brutal lawlessness and violent race prejudices here at home than by passing resolutions about wrong doing elsewhere. Nevertheless there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is not our manifest duty to endeavor at least to show our disapproval of the deed and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it. The cases must be extreme in which such a course is justifiable.

Henry Kissinger failed because he lived in the era of 1815 and was not aware that the Third World is as much a factor as the Soviet Union in framing a sound foreign policy for the United States. I assert this, not on the grounds of morality, but on an estimate of realities in an era in which gunboat diplomacy is not only discredited but unwise, futile.

The Universality of Human Rights

E. Raymond Platig

Professor Halle and Father Hesburgh do not provide us with the opening statements for a great debate on morality and foreign policy. However, they are both clearly concerned with one issue that deserves serious debate: the place of human rights in contemporary American foreign policy. Each approaches the matter through his own vocation but with considerable understanding of the other's. Although the human rights issue is never clearly drawn, there are important differences of emphasis that can be highlighted for comment.

Different Emphases — Different Worldviews?

It is part of the vocation of diplomatic historians and analysts to weigh the accomplishments of political leaders against their intentions and claims, to uncover the realities encountered by political man and thus to help keep the feet of contemporary and future leaders on the ground. After decades in the pursuit of this vocation Professor Halle approaches the subject of morality and foreign policy with considerable discomfort. He is clearly repulsed by the

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evil done in the name of good through Manichaean crusades. He is equally repulsed by individuals who fit the description Emily Brontë gave one of her characters: "the wearisomest self-righteous Pharisee that ever ransacked a Bible to rake the promises to himself and fling the curses to his neighbours." But what seems to distress Professor Halle most are those idealists who in their anxiety to achieve a particular moral value — peace, truth-telling — misread the realities, overlook the principle of workability, and help bring on an evil greater than that to be righted.

It is to guard against these errors of idealism that Professor Halle is most intent. To this end he reminds us that we live in a world of culturally diverse sovereign states, reaffirms the traditional diplomatic principle of domestic jurisdiction, declares that morality begins at home, propounds the morality of the lesser evil, invokes Lincoln, and places upon the shoulders of those who bear responsibility the task of deciphering which set of anticipated practical consequences constitutes the lesser evil.

Applying these thoughts to American foreign policy, Mr. Halle suggests that the greatest contemporary danger is a form of national pharisaism in which he finds, however, an element of innocence that its personal pharisaism lacks. That is to say, American national pharisaism "represents the ignorance of parochialism no less than the vainglory of self-righteousness" when it seeks to project abroad Jeffersonian Democracy or such concomitants as today go under the rubric of human rights.

The issue could be more directly joined if Father Hesburgh defended parochialism and self-righteousness. Clearly he does not. But just as clearly he sees the contemporary danger as a denial rather than a strong affirmation of the American commitment to human rights as a basic tenet of American foreign policy. He sets out to combat that danger, exemplifying that part of the theological vocation which follows the prophetic tradition of invoking the past and calling nations and leaders to transcend the narrow values of the present. In a secular age "human" values provide a more acceptable basis for transcending parochial values than do the commands of tribal gods. And universal human aspirations provide part of the basis for Father Hesburgh's call to the American nation and its leaders to increase the moral content of U.S. foreign policy. Fortunately, from Father Hesburgh's point of view, the aspirations enshrined in the American experience represent the best expression of mankind's universal hope. Therefore the American heritage provides a second basis for enhanced emphasis upon human rights, and thus morality — as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other aspects of international law provide a third.

In passing, Father Hesburgh acknowledges cultural di-

versity, is aware of the limitations of national power, and commends prudential judgment (the choice of the lesser evil?) in weighing human rights objectives against other national objectives. He is far from being the perfect target for Louis Halle's warnings.

Still, about the ways in which human rights concerns should enter into the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy, the difference in emphasis is considerable. How is this difference to be explained? Not, I would submit, simply on the basis of the vocations of the two authors. Important as these may be, it is also the case that those propounding either emphasis can be found in both vocations — and others as well, including the vocations of public official and media commentator. One suspects that at issue here are fundamentally different worldviews, important because they are reflected in the attitudes of the American people about this nation's role in the world. Rather than burrow into the unstated premises of these different worldviews, I will limit my comments to a cursory examination of a few propositions that seem essential to Father Hesburgh's position concerning American responsibilities for human rights and, I suspect, to Professor Halle's formulations.

Human Rights in American Foreign Policy

I would begin by stating a specific — and I believe noncontroversial — rendition of the Halle principle of workability. To wit: the long-range effectiveness of a foreign policy dedicated to advancing human rights in a multicultural world of sovereign states will depend in large degree upon the constancy and moderation with which that policy is supported by the American people and, just as importantly, by peoples elsewhere.

This requires that American leaders be able to articulate persuasively at home and abroad the assumptions that justify establishing America's commitment to human rights as a basic and permanent tenet of U.S. foreign policy. Father Hesburgh's paper suggests three such justifying assumptions. An obligation flowing from (1) the American heritage, (2) international law, and (3) universal human aspirations. Some reflections on each are in order.

The American heritage: These days few U.S. citizens quarrel openly with America's commitment to human rights at home, though it is useful to remind ourselves that in 1977 the KKK drew a crowd to a meeting in Plains, Georgia, and that a New York City blackout unleashed a paroxysm of looting. Despite such remnants of the darker side of the American experience, the popular commitment to human rights at home is deeply rooted in the more enlightened aspects of our immigrant origins, religious professions, traditions, and aspirations as a people. Father Hesburgh does

not overlook the contribution made by the blessings of geography; he might usefully have reflected also on the blessings of historical timing.

The American political heritage of rights and freedoms under law is one from which individuals, movements, and nations have drawn inspiration since the very founding of the Republic. But even though widely admired, envied, or emulated, our national traditions and way of life are still particular ones, shared in part by some, attacked by others, "foreign" to many. However much Americans may believe and proclaim that their way of life is an especially virtuous expression of eternal and universal truths, it remains the case that these claims do not meet with universal concurrence in a world of great diversity and shattering change.

In such a world (in which, incidentally, we cannot be sure how close to the surface lies the darker side of our tradition) there is undoubted wisdom in reaffirming our commitment to the enlightened side of our heritage. This simultaneously inspires Americans among themselves to seek justice in freedom and equality, and stabilizes and brightens the American image abroad. But our same national heritage does not in itself provide a sufficient basis on which to universalize our commitment to human rights and actively project it abroad. To assume, speak, and act otherwise leaves us open to the various errors pointed up by Professor Halle, those running from naïveté through excessive pride and ethnocentric arrogance to ideological manipulation.

Moreover, if the American heritage is invoked continuously by official spokesmen as the basis for our universal commitment, it can stimulate not only public support — as available evidence suggests it has done to date — but also intolerant nationalistic passions that can be further fired and manipulated by spokesmen for ethnic, religious, national, or other partisan interests. This in turn can force more adventurous or confrontational national policies than those supported by the prudential assessments of competing objectives, costs, and consequences apparently favored by Father Hesburgh as well as Mr. Halle. Our national history suggests that, once unleashed, popular political-moral enthusiams for exporting one or more aspect of the American way of life drive policy to quixotic, counterproductive extremes and lead to lengthy periods of disillusionment and withdrawal before moderation is restored. Immoderation, an always present possibility for a people who want to "win" the good causes they champion, and win quickly, undermines constancy.

International law: International law may provide a better basis for the claim of universality, but it has numerous handicaps that render it insufficient. It is neither widely understood nor accepted that the legal commitments na-

tions have undertaken since World War II to respect and promote human rights override the seemingly potent legal defense of "noninterference" in matters of "domestic jurisdiction" — a defense especially dear to the Communist and Latin American states but also widely invoked elsewhere. In addition, the fact that most nations, including the United States, generally feel obliged to consult international law as one factor in policy development, but do not feel obliged to have policy conform strictly to applicable legal provisions, makes international law an uncertain reed on which to rest American policy, even when lawyers agree on the clarity with which the law speaks.

Moreover, international law is viewed by many — including some distinguished Western scholars — as a product of Western culture, rooted in its Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, and Western European traditions, tilted in favor of nations who benefit from the status quo, resistant to change, and thus not considered binding in all of its assumptions and aspects by the plethora of new states in non-Western cultural areas. The leaders and peoples of many of these states are not only dissatisfied with the "injustices" of the present international order but also have traditions that assign meanings quite different from ours to such fundamental concepts as law, state, and justice — to say nothing of even more basic concepts like time, nature, and truth. Given such attitudes and such fundamental diversity, one has to question the significance of the fact that numerous governments espouse civil and political rights in their constitutions and in their treaty commitments. The espousal itself may be one of those partial truths that obscures more than it reveals about the universality of international law and political morality.

In these circumstances it is difficult to believe that a vigorous, unilateral American effort to educate the world's nations about their human rights obligations under international law would be welcomed by more than a few. It would be viewed by other nations either as an ideological cover for more crass U.S. or Western interests, as the preaching of the privileged insensitive to harsh world realities, as hypocritical in the absence of U.S. ratification of the Covenants on Human Rights, as cultural imperialism, or as a naïve but harmless American idiosyncracy. Few, if any, would support an American role in which we were perceived to be unilateral investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury pronouncing on the compliance of other governments with respect to their international legal obligations, even if we then eschewed the role of enforcer out of prudential considerations.

Universal human aspirations: Even if these aspirations are best captured in the genius of Jefferson's formulation of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, they are pur-

sued in a profuse variety of social settings that defies their ready translation into more specific universalities or even broad commonalities.

Human aspirations are expressed around the world in local idioms shaped and constrained by culture, geography, and political practices frequently more deeply rooted than our own. Such forces do not yield readily to fundamental change; indeed to the peoples involved such change is frequently more laden with threat than promise. This is particularly true of civil and political rights that are inseparable from the restraints that governments and cultures impose upon and expect of individuals. Patterns of reciprocal rights, duties, obligations, and restraints are so variegated in content and intricately woven that it is generally beyond the sensitivity and wisdom of outsiders to alter them without encountering insuperable resistance or inducing social and political chaos, or both.

The search across major cultural and religious traditions for common moral principles in support of human rights has not been notably successful. There is, to be sure, evidence of a widespread human aspiration for life, sustenance, companionship, and freedom from repression. But this does not bespeak a common code of humane treatment, a common sense of economic and social justice, or a common fabric of civil and political rights, obligations, and supporting institutions.

There does not exist in the modern world a single, dominant moral framework, philosophy of history, sense of direction, or consensus on a general and evolving scheme of values. Father Hesburgh is probably correct in suggesting that the peace and happiness of the world depend on the development of some such common vision, and that time may be running out. However, it is sobering for Americans to remind themselves that their vision has not yet resolved the mysteries of social change and progress in non-Western societies — and sometimes in Western ones as well. These mysteries have defied active American theories and doctrines running the gamut from sharing the white man's burden, through making the world safe for self-determined democracies, through Point Four and nation-building.

The existence of universal human aspirations provides a necessary base on which to rest a broadly international quest for human dignity and social, economic, civil, and political justice. It offers little guidance for U.S. foreign policy. To seek that guidance solely in the American heritage and international law is likely to result in national pharisaism, which, however innocent, runs the risk of becoming Manichaeism.

In these circumstances Professor Halle suggests that the American Government concentrate on making American

society a tacit example of what free men can accomplish, and let elements in the private sector speak out on human rights issues abroad. Father Hesburgh, on the other hand, would factor human rights concerns into official policy, while eschewing with President Carter the attempt to apply rigid moral maxims, and relying with Secretary Vance upon prudential judgments on a case-by-case basis.

Among his prescriptions Father Hesburgh sets forth one thought that, with further elaboration, may contain the seeds of a hopeful new departure. He calls for a careful exploration of the extent to which "compatible moral standards exist on a world scale" as, apparently, a step toward the attainment of "some higher degree of moral unity." Presumably he sees this as a broadly multicultural enterprise. How would he carry this forward? Does he propose a role for existing international organizations [the United Nations University, UNESCO, OAS, OAU, etc.) or foresee the need for new settings? Does he propose U.S. government and/or private inspiration for — and leadership in — this endeavor? Does such an American role require for its effectiveness that Americans be prepared as much as they expect others to be to listen, learn, and adjust? And, closing the circle on the need for public constancy and moderation, does this not require of Americans an abiding but undoctrinaire and still questing faith in the American experiment?

An affirmative answer to the last question seems hard to avoid. Therefore, if that requirement is to be met, the human rights rhetoric of public and private American leaders had best be characterized by modest claims and guided by careful distinctions concerning American, foreign, and universal commitments.

Common Moral Judgments vs. Certain Differences: Some Concluding Thoughts

Kenneth W. Thompson

On first reading, those who turn to this collection of essays may be more impressed with the number of differences than with their similarities. Father Hesburgh speaks for a respected tradition in American thought, that of moral idealism; Halle, by contrast, is an important representative of the school of political realism. Hesburgh has faith that proclaiming American ideals and values has important consequences in the world. Halle has three reservations to moral exhortation: (1) Those who make moral pronouncements

must guard against pharisaism and self-righteousness. (2) They must also understand that our deeds speak louder than our words. And (3) they must recognize the ambiguities of political and foreign policy choices wherein nations are sometimes required to employ morally questionable means to achieve morally worthy ends.

Hesburgh and Halle may also differ on the extent of moral consensus in the world. Hesburgh believes there is a deep and underlying respect for the fundamental values of American society, if only others can perceive or be taught the true meaning and relevance of such values. Hesburgh is more of a universalist than Halle, who sees the world as a culturally and politically pluralistic society. For Hesburgh the world approaches what sociologists call a community, while Halle would describe it as a society or an order in which common interests are more attainable than mutual trust. Nations, Hesburgh believes, and particularly the United States, must speak for something nobler and more exalted than self-interest, whereas Halle inclines toward George F. Kennan's view that national interest, properly conceived, may be the highest moral attainment of a state. Hesburgh is impressed with the progress in American society — progress for which he might well take some credit — in the realm of civil rights. Halle appears to believe that we are wise to let our progress speak for itself and recognize the infinite diversity of civil societies around the world. We had also better be clear that our progress is as far-reaching as we claim before we lecture other peoples.

Hesburgh's approach places greater emphasis on possibilities and Halle's on limitations of a moral foreign policy. If the United States offers nothing more than the image of a powerful and prosperous society, Hesburgh fears no one will respond and follow our leadership. Moreover, he believes that values must be articulated — defined, clarified, and reinterpreted in a changing international context. The leaders of other societies are not reticent in stating their national purposes and the ideological visions they hope others will understand and accept. We may not be required to "shout to the heavens that we are the party of liberty" or the champion of other values, but neither should we be silent about our deeply held beliefs. Halle is concerned that whenever we proclaim to other countries our devotion to particular values, we recognize that they will expect our declarations to be followed by appropriate actions (for example, in defense of "freedom fighters" in Hungary in 1956) and we had better be clear we have the will and the resources to back up strong words.

Hesburgh shows a certain tendency (although he is not unaware of the risks) to emphasize a single value — for example, human rights or economic development. Halle

warns that foreign policy imperatives demand that values be seen in relationship to one another. We may be in favor of human rights in the Soviet Union, but we also want an agreement on strategic arms limitations, as is currently being pursued in the SALT negotiations. Reinhold Niebuhr, while respecting the thought of both writers, would probably have been closer to Halle than to Hesburgh on this point, for he compared the political leader to a juggler required to keep several balls in the air. Hesburgh is closer to monism than Halle, who is a self-styled pluralist on values. It may be worth noting that President Carter has come under criticism for the same error for which Presidents Nixon and Johnson were held guilty, namely, the disposition of viewing each foreign policy problem as though it were self-contained or could be approached in a watertight compartment.

Halle on the other hand may come perilously close to moral cynicism in some of his judgments — a failing that Niebuhr associated with political realism. Cynicism and utopianism were to Niebuhr opposite sides of the same coin; America was likely to fall prey to one tendency at a particular moment in its history and to the other at another time.

With all their differences, Halle and Hesburgh are in agreement on the need and possibility of practical morality. The search for norms and values that can provide practical standards for evaluating American foreign policy, or any nation's foreign policy, is primarily a quest for viable and coherent guides to action. Those who seek moral answers must find their way through the twisted wreckage of a multitude of earlier endeavors that failed either from an excess of narrow cynicism or too lofty forms of idealism. Thinkers who wrestle with the ambiguities and contradictions of the moral problems must do so within a concrete historical and political context. Attitudes and policies by government toward international morality create an intellectual and moral climate, and the response of national and international publics reinforce or conflict with their pronouncements and policies. A regime may come to power proclaiming certain goals and purposes; popular opinions are bent or shaped by its declarations. The climate for thinking and writing about political morality in the administrations of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Richard M. Nixon, or Jimmy Carter has reflected far-reaching differences. On one occasion the student of political morality may be disposed to counter one set of attitudes or illusions (or to defend them) and on another occasion he may be led by changing circumstances to see the moral problem in a quite different light. The social observer stands within history; he is fated to be a creature of the national and political environment about which he writes. By con-

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trast, the physical or biological scientist in his laboratory is significantly free of these constraints. The scientist's position in the political order or his judgments of the wisdom or unwisdom of certain political attitudes or approaches usually are not a determining factor for his basic research on cancer or the physical properties of an object in space.

Fortunately the moral philosopher or social scientist is not bereft of supporting resources that possess objective and lasting value. The broad realm of practical legal and political philosophy provides examples and signposts of recurrent concerns and trends of thought addressed to ethics and politics, some of which may offend the pure theorists of political or moral thought but serve nonetheless to guide and direct the observer to focus on the central issues. He may learn from ancient and modern legal and political writings and from his own sense of the moral predicament — as when Edmond Cahn, the legal theorist, wrote: "This predicament I have truly known; I have not merely understood it in my mind. I have felt it in my bones, it belongs to me; through it I have acquired a wiser moral insight" (*The Moral Decision*, 1955).

In personal life most of us have learned to live with moral predicaments as they have appeared; we have felt them in our bones and responded with as much intelligence, intuition, and judgment as we could muster. For those who live with their decisions in foreign policy as the rest of us live with our decisions in personal life, the highest realizable form of judgment is political prudence, and practical morality is the highest moral attainment. "Prudence," wrote Niebuhr, "is a civic virtue because it is necessary not only to strive for justice, but to take cognizance of all contingencies in preserving the stability and health of a community. Prudence is the wise application of the principles of justice to the contingencies of interest and power in political life." The process involves, not only the use of reason, but blind groping and intuition. "Political tasks," Niebuhr argued, "require a shrewd admixture of principle and expediency, of loyalty to general standards of justice and adjustment to actual power."

Prudence and practical morality have not commended themselves to many of those who write on morality and foreign policy in the United States. Utopian idealists would put an end to the role of interest and power in political life. Expediency more often is given a pejorative than a positive meaning. Talk of the need to recognize the limitations of morality has led followers of the late Leo Strauss to condemn what they decry as an ethic of self-denial. The poet laments the tendency of man to do the right thing for the wrong reason. Pragmatism is denounced for its negative slant, and the cynic finds fault with practical morality of

claiming too much for morality in politics, even as the moralist questions whether it claims too little.

Yet practical morality and prudence persist as guides to political action, and they can be traced as the common element in both the Halle and Hesburgh papers (especially the latter's concluding portion). Prudence in politics supplies concrete reasons where abstract principles are insufficient. Edmund Burke considered prudence first in the rank of virtues for politics and morality. Its rules are seldom exact and almost never universal, although ultimately prudence makes reference to ideals that are universal.

One can never be certain of prudential judgments, since they forecast the future, and the failures of applied prudence rest on the fact that every political strategy falls short of its goals or bears only the most remote relationship to what was intended. Democracy represents, from one perspective, an institutionalized form of prudence, with its balancing of power and its methods of finding solutions to apparently insoluble problems. (It is a bit surprising that neither Hesburgh nor Halle says much about this aspect of democracy.) In a sense democracy entails the ironic triumph of common sense over the foolishness of wise men. "Wise men are inevitably tempted to follow either one or the other line of 'rational' advance of which the bourgeois and the Marxist ideologues are perfect types. The one form of thought regards all social and historical processes as self-regulating. The alternative type of thought [Marxism] conceives a social or historical goal, presumably desired for all humanity, and seeks to 'plan' for its achievement" (Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, 1952). Edmund Burke put the problem yet more forcefully, saying: "I have known, and . . . cooperated with great men; and I have never yet seen any plan which has not been mended by the observations of those who were much inferior to the person who took the lead" ("Reflections," *Works*, vol. 3). If one reads Burke with the late twentieth century in mind, one might well conclude that so-called inferior cultures may be needed to mend the plans of superior ones.

Therefore, political morality or practical morality, compared with abstract morality, remains close to the people, to politics, and to the moral problem. Practical morality is unashamed to settle for the best possible solution. It strives to prevent the destruction of higher moral principles by claims for their immediate application, knowing full well they are too far removed to offer concrete guidance for every foreign policy problem. Precepts that do offer guidance are not in themselves the final ends of society but coexist with other precepts and guidelines.

Because practical morality asks less of moral principles, it leaves more to their continuing influence. This influence is built, not on fixed codes or universal standards, but on a

persistent process of continuing moral and political evaluation. If there is need for this more modest conception of the role of morality in *domestic* politics, replacing those moral preachments that are quickly succeeded by cynical practice, its importance is even greater on the *international* scene, where the force of nationalism gives the clash of interest and power an intensity and ferocity unequalled in other spheres. For internationally, as Hans J. Morgenthau has observed, "the claim to universality which inspires the moral code of one particular group is incompatible with the identical claim of another group; the world has room for only one, and the other must yield or be destroyed."

Practical morality knows that the zeal for a cause may be one of the strongest and most dangerous irritants to which human passion is subject. It strives, therefore, to limit the crusading spirit. Practical morality proceeds on the basis of the ubiquity of both self-interest and national interests. Hence it seeks ways of identifying convergent interests, not denying their existence. Practical morality is persuaded that neither men nor nations can escape moral valuations. Thus it rejects moral cynicism. Practical morality understands the reality of power without sanctifying it as man's final end in life. Instead it warns of its perils, mitigates conflicts of power, channels it to constructive ends, civilizes the means it employs, and seeks to protect individuals in their pursuit of more ultimate ends such as freedom and equality. Practical morality operates at the intersection of politics and morality, neither promising utopia nor accepting the "war of each against all." It draws on the thought of great minds and the lessons of experience while looking creatively for new turns; it serves men in the here and now without abandoning hope for a better future; it is forever in the process of becoming rather than confined to tablets of stone. Practical morality, therefore, serves men both in the present and for the future. It espouses the values set out by Father Hesburgh while attending to the means delineated by Professor Halle. Thus it draws together, with all their differences, the common elements of the two frameworks to provide a new synthesis for the auditing and evaluation of American foreign policy measured by certain well-established moral standards central to the American experience.

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